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Legislative deferrals :statutory ambiguity, judicial power, and American democracy /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	342.73/052
書名/作者:	Legislative deferrals : : statutory ambiguity, judicial power, and American democracy // George I. Lovell.
作者:	Lovell, George I.,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xxi, 290 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 08 Oct 2015).
標題:	Political questions and judicial power - United States.
標題:	Judge-made law - United States.
標題:	Legislative power - United States.
標題:	Separation of powers - United States.
ISBN:	9780511509872 (ebook)
內容註:	Rethinking judicial policy making in a separation of powers system -- False victories: labor, Congress, and the courts, 1898-1935 -- "As harmless as an infant": the Erdman Act in Congress and the courts -- Killing with kindness: legislative ambiguity, judicial policy making, and the Clayton Act -- The Norris-LaGuardia Act, for once: learning what to learn from the past -- Legislative deferrals and judicial policy making in the administrative state: a brief look at the Wagner Act.
摘要、提要註:	Why do unelected federal judges have so much power to make policy in the United States? Why were federal judges able to thwart apparent legislative victories won by labor organizations in the Lochner era? Most scholars who have addressed such questions assume that the answer lies in the judiciary's constitutionally guaranteed independence, and thus worry that insulated judges threaten democracy when they stray from baseline positions chosen by legislators. This book argues for a fundamental shift in the way scholars think about judicial policy-making. Scholars need to notice that legislators also empower judges to make policy as a means of escaping accountability. This study of legislative deference to the courts offers a dramatic reinterpretation of the history of twentieth-century labor law and shows how attention to legislative deferrals can help scholars to address vexing questions about the consequences of judicial power in a democracy.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511509872

Legislative deferrals :statutory ambiguity, judicial power, and American democracy /
Lovell, George I.,

Legislative deferrals :statutory ambiguity, judicial power, and American democracy /George I. Lovell. - 1 online resource (xxi, 290 pages) :digital, PDF file(s).

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 08 Oct 2015).

Rethinking judicial policy making in a separation of powers system -- False victories: labor, Congress, and the courts, 1898-1935 -- "As harmless as an infant": the Erdman Act in Congress and the courts -- Killing with kindness: legislative ambiguity, judicial policy making, and the Clayton Act -- The Norris-LaGuardia Act, for once: learning what to learn from the past -- Legislative deferrals and judicial policy making in the administrative state: a brief look at the Wagner Act.

Why do unelected federal judges have so much power to make policy in the United States? Why were federal judges able to thwart apparent legislative victories won by labor organizations in the Lochner era? Most scholars who have addressed such questions assume that the answer lies in the judiciary's constitutionally guaranteed independence, and thus worry that insulated judges threaten democracy when they stray from baseline positions chosen by legislators. This book argues for a fundamental shift in the way scholars think about judicial policy-making. Scholars need to notice that legislators also empower judges to make policy as a means of escaping accountability. This study of legislative deference to the courts offers a dramatic reinterpretation of the history of twentieth-century labor law and shows how attention to legislative deferrals can help scholars to address vexing questions about the consequences of judicial power in a democracy.

ISBN: 9780511509872 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

340689
Political questions and judicial power
--United States.

LC Class. No.: KF5130 / .L68 2003

Dewey Class. No.: 342.73/052

Legislative deferrals :statutory ambiguity, judicial power, and American democracy /
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