大葉大學圖書館 |

Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	347.73/12
書名/作者:	Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review // Christopher F. Zurn.
其他題名:	Deliberative Democracy & the Institutions of Judicial Review
作者:	Zurn, Christopher F.,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (viii, 366 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Judicial review - United States.
標題:	Constitutional courts - United States.
標題:	Legislative power - United States.
標題:	Executive power - United States.
標題:	Deliberative democracy - United States.
ISBN:	9780511498749 (ebook)
內容註:	pt. I. Introduction. An old chestnut is actually two ; Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation ; Functions and institutions -- pt. II. Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights ; Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy ; Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism -- pt. III. From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis ; Constitutionalism: four central elements ; Constitutional democracy? -- pt. IV. Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism ; Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle ; Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating? -- pt. V. Disagreement and the constitution of democracy. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman ; Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron ; Upshot: we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism -- pt. VI. The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? ; Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication ; Legal principles and moral-political reasoning -- pt. VII. Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy. A provisional summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review ; Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas -- pt. VIII. The institutions of constitutional review I: design problems and judicial review. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review ; Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system -- pt. IX. The Institutions of constitutional review II: horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies ; Mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal ; Easing formal amendability requirements ; Establishing civic constitutional fora.
摘要、提要註:	In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498749

Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review /
Zurn, Christopher F.,1966-

Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review /Deliberative Democracy & the Institutions of Judicial ReviewChristopher F. Zurn. - 1 online resource (viii, 366 pages) :digital, PDF file(s).

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

pt. I. Introduction. An old chestnut is actually two ; Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation ; Functions and institutions -- pt. II. Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights ; Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy ; Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism -- pt. III. From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis ; Constitutionalism: four central elements ; Constitutional democracy? -- pt. IV. Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism ; Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle ; Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating? -- pt. V. Disagreement and the constitution of democracy. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman ; Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron ; Upshot: we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism -- pt. VI. The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? ; Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication ; Legal principles and moral-political reasoning -- pt. VII. Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy. A provisional summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review ; Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas -- pt. VIII. The institutions of constitutional review I: design problems and judicial review. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review ; Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system -- pt. IX. The Institutions of constitutional review II: horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies ; Mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal ; Easing formal amendability requirements ; Establishing civic constitutional fora.

In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision.

ISBN: 9780511498749 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

393308
Judicial review
--United States.

LC Class. No.: KF4550.Z9 / Z87 2007

Dewey Class. No.: 347.73/12

Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review /
LDR:04450nam a22003258i 4500 001 448043
003 UkCbUP
005 20151005020623.0
006 m|||||o||d||||||||
007 cr||||||||||||
008 161201s2007||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020 $a 9780511498749 (ebook)
020 $z 9780521867344 (hardback)
020 $z 9780521119801 (paperback)
035 $a CR9780511498749
040 $a UkCbUP $b eng $e rda $c UkCbUP
043 $a n-us---
050 0 0 $a KF4550.Z9 $b Z87 2007
082 0 0 $a 347.73/12 $2 22
100 1 $a Zurn, Christopher F., $d 1966- $3 379702
245 1 0 $a Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review / $c Christopher F. Zurn.
246 3 $a Deliberative Democracy & the Institutions of Judicial Review
264 1 $a Cambridge : $b Cambridge University Press, $c 2007.
300 $a 1 online resource (viii, 366 pages) : $b digital, PDF file(s).
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
505 0 $a pt. I. Introduction. An old chestnut is actually two ; Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation ; Functions and institutions -- pt. II. Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights ; Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy ; Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism -- pt. III. From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis ; Constitutionalism: four central elements ; Constitutional democracy? -- pt. IV. Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism ; Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle ; Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating? -- pt. V. Disagreement and the constitution of democracy. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman ; Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron ; Upshot: we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism -- pt. VI. The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? ; Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication ; Legal principles and moral-political reasoning -- pt. VII. Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy. A provisional summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review ; Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas -- pt. VIII. The institutions of constitutional review I: design problems and judicial review. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review ; Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system -- pt. IX. The Institutions of constitutional review II: horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies ; Mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal ; Easing formal amendability requirements ; Establishing civic constitutional fora.
520 $a In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision.
650 0 $a Judicial review $z United States. $3 393308
650 0 $a Constitutional courts $z United States. $3 415427
650 0 $a Legislative power $z United States. $3 415428
650 0 $a Executive power $z United States. $3 373371
650 0 $a Deliberative democracy $z United States. $3 376268
776 0 8 $i Print version: $z 9780521867344
856 4 0 $u http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498749