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Liability rules in patent law[electr...
~
Krauspenhaar, Daniel.
Liability rules in patent law[electronic resource] :a legal and economic analysis /
紀錄類型:
書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:
346.0486
書名/作者:
Liability rules in patent law : a legal and economic analysis // by Daniel Krauspenhaar.
作者:
Krauspenhaar, Daniel.
出版者:
Berlin, Heidelberg : : Springer Berlin Heidelberg :, 2015.
面頁冊數:
xix, 233 p. : : ill., digital ;; 24 cm.
Contained By:
Springer eBooks
標題:
Patent laws and legislation.
標題:
Liability (Law)
標題:
Law.
標題:
International IT and Media Law, Intellectual Property Law.
標題:
Law and Economics.
ISBN:
9783642409004 (electronic bk.)
ISBN:
9783642408991 (paper)
內容註:
Introductory Remarks -- Overuse of Exclusivity in Patent Law -- Private Liability Rule Regimes -- Compulsory Liability Rule and Liability Rule by Default Regimes -- Overall View and Conclusion.
摘要、提要註:
The primary purpose of a patent law system should be to enhance economic efficiency, in particular by providing incentives for making inventions. The conventional wisdom is that patents should therefore be strictly exclusive rights. Moreover, in practice patent owners are almost never forced to give up their right to exclude others and receive only a certain amount of remuneration with, for instance, compulsory licensing. Other economically interesting patent-law objectives, however, include the transfer and dissemination of knowledge. Mechanisms exist by which the patent owner decides if he or she would prefer exclusive or non-exclusive rights, for instance the opportunity to declare the willingness to license and create patent pools. But it is questionable whether these mechanisms are sufficient and efficient enough in view of the existence of patent trolls and other problems. This work challenges the conventional wisdom to a certain extent and makes proposals for improvements.
電子資源:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40900-4
Liability rules in patent law[electronic resource] :a legal and economic analysis /
Krauspenhaar, Daniel.
Liability rules in patent law
a legal and economic analysis /[electronic resource] :by Daniel Krauspenhaar. - Berlin, Heidelberg :Springer Berlin Heidelberg :2015. - xix, 233 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Munich studies on innovation and competition,v.12199-7462 ;. - Munich studies on innovation and competition ;v.1..
Introductory Remarks -- Overuse of Exclusivity in Patent Law -- Private Liability Rule Regimes -- Compulsory Liability Rule and Liability Rule by Default Regimes -- Overall View and Conclusion.
The primary purpose of a patent law system should be to enhance economic efficiency, in particular by providing incentives for making inventions. The conventional wisdom is that patents should therefore be strictly exclusive rights. Moreover, in practice patent owners are almost never forced to give up their right to exclude others and receive only a certain amount of remuneration with, for instance, compulsory licensing. Other economically interesting patent-law objectives, however, include the transfer and dissemination of knowledge. Mechanisms exist by which the patent owner decides if he or she would prefer exclusive or non-exclusive rights, for instance the opportunity to declare the willingness to license and create patent pools. But it is questionable whether these mechanisms are sufficient and efficient enough in view of the existence of patent trolls and other problems. This work challenges the conventional wisdom to a certain extent and makes proposals for improvements.
ISBN: 9783642409004 (electronic bk.)
Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-642-40900-4doiSubjects--Topical Terms:
341337
Patent laws and legislation.
LC Class. No.: K1505
Dewey Class. No.: 346.0486
Liability rules in patent law[electronic resource] :a legal and economic analysis /
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