Philosophical psychopathology :philo...
Young, Garry, (1966-)

 

  • Philosophical psychopathology :philosophy without thought experiments /
  • 紀錄類型: 書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
    杜威分類號: 616.89001
    書名/作者: Philosophical psychopathology : : philosophy without thought experiments // Garry Young.
    作者: Young, Garry,
    面頁冊數: 1 online resource.
    標題: Psychology, Pathological - Philosophy.
    標題: HEALTH & FITNESS / Diseases / General
    標題: MEDICAL / Clinical Medicine
    標題: MEDICAL / Diseases
    標題: MEDICAL / Evidence-Based Medicine
    標題: MEDICAL / Internal Medicine
    ISBN: 1137329327 (electronic bk.)
    ISBN: 9781137329325 (electronic bk.)
    內容註: 1. Introduction -- PART I: THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN INTENTIONAL ACTION -- 2. Philosophical Issue 1: Conscious Inessentialism -- 3. Blindsight and Other Visuomotor Pathologies -- 4. Philosophical Issue 2: What Makes an Action Intentional? -- 5. Anarchic Hand -- 6. Alien Control -- 7. Philosophical Issue 2 Revisited: Conscious Decision Making and Free Will -- PART II: THOUGHT, SUBJECTIVITY AND RATIONALITY -- 8. Philosophical Issue 3: What Makes a Thought My Thought? -- 9. Thought Insertion -- 10. Philosophical Issue 4: What is it to be Rational? -- 11. The Capgras Delusion -- 12. The Cotard Delusion -- PART III: KNOWLEDGE HOW AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL REDUCTION -- 13. Philosophical Issue 5: Ryle's Dichotomy and the Intellectualist Challenge -- 14. Visuomotor Pathologies Revisited.
    摘要、提要註: Garry Young presents examples of rare pathological conditions such as blindsight, anarchic hand, alien control and various delusional states to inform fundamental questions on topics relating to consciousness, intentional action, thought and rationality, as well as what is required to possess certain kinds of knowledge. Rather than trying to answer these questions by inventing far-fetched scenario or 'thought experiments', this book argues that there is a better but, at present, under-used resource available: namely, clinical case studies evidence. Thus, when inquiry as to whether consciousness must necessarily accompany our intentional action, instead of creating a philosophical zombie why not look to the actions of those suffering from blindsight or visual agnosia. Similarly, when considering whether it is possible to doubt that one thinks, why invent a malicious demon as Descartes did when one can draw on delusional evidence from those suffering from thought insertion who deny certain thoughts are theirs.
    電子資源: http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doifinder/10.1057/9781137329325
Export
取書館別
 
 
變更密碼
登入