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Perfect Deterrence.[electronic resou...

Biersteker, Thomas.

Perfect Deterrence.[electronic resource].

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	355.0217
書名/作者:	Perfect Deterrence.
作者:	Zagare, Frank C.
其他作者:	Biersteker, Thomas.
出版者:	Cambridge : : Cambridge University Press,, 2000.
面頁冊數:	443 p.
標題:	Deterrence (Strategy).
ISBN:	9780511491788 (electronic bk.)
ISBN:	9780521781749 (print)
內容註:	Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Figures; Tables; Preface; 1 Classical deterrence theory; 2 Rationality and deterrence; 3 Credibility and deterrence; 4 Uncertainty and mutual deterrence; 5 Unilateral deterrence; 6 Modeling extended deterrence; 7 Modeling Massive Retaliation; 8 Modeling Flexible Response; 9 Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence; 10 Perfect Deterrence Theory; Appendices; Appendix 1 Deterrence models; Appendix 2 Useful definitions; Appendix 3 Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game
摘要、提要註:	This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors' analysis provides a new understanding of threats and responses, and yields some surprising conclusions.
電子資源:	Click here to view book

Perfect Deterrence.[electronic resource].
Zagare, Frank C.

Perfect Deterrence.[electronic resource]. - Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,2000. - 443 p.

Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Figures; Tables; Preface; 1 Classical deterrence theory; 2 Rationality and deterrence; 3 Credibility and deterrence; 4 Uncertainty and mutual deterrence; 5 Unilateral deterrence; 6 Modeling extended deterrence; 7 Modeling Massive Retaliation; 8 Modeling Flexible Response; 9 Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence; 10 Perfect Deterrence Theory; Appendices; Appendix 1 Deterrence models; Appendix 2 Useful definitions; Appendix 3 Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game

This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors' analysis provides a new understanding of threats and responses, and yields some surprising conclusions.

Electronic reproduction.

Available via World Wide Web.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

ISBN: 9780511491788 (electronic bk.)Subjects--Topical Terms:

380949
Deterrence (Strategy).
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

336502
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: U162.6 .Z34 2000eb

Dewey Class. No.: 355.0217

Perfect Deterrence.[electronic resource].
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300 $a 443 p.
505 0 $a Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Figures; Tables; Preface; 1 Classical deterrence theory; 2 Rationality and deterrence; 3 Credibility and deterrence; 4 Uncertainty and mutual deterrence; 5 Unilateral deterrence; 6 Modeling extended deterrence; 7 Modeling Massive Retaliation; 8 Modeling Flexible Response; 9 Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence; 10 Perfect Deterrence Theory; Appendices; Appendix 1 Deterrence models; Appendix 2 Useful definitions; Appendix 3 Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game
505 8 $a Appendix 4 Generalized Mutual Deterrence GameAppendix 5 Unilateral Deterrence Game; Appendix 8 Asymmetric Escalation Game: general version; References; Index
520 $a This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors' analysis provides a new understanding of threats and responses, and yields some surprising conclusions.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $n Available via World Wide Web.
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655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 336502
700 1 $a Biersteker, Thomas. $3 380599
700 1 $a Brown, Chris. $3 380600
700 1 $a Cerny, Phil. $3 380601
700 1 $a Grieco, Joseph. $3 380602
700 1 $a Groom, A. J. R. $3 380603
700 1 $a Kilgour, D. Marc. $3 567497
700 1 $a Smith, Steve. $3 380604
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