Advances in financial economics.[ele...
Ferris, Stephen P.

 

  • Advances in financial economics.[electronic resource] /Vol. 15
  • 紀錄類型: 書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
    杜威分類號: 658.4
    書名/作者: Advances in financial economics./ edited by Stephen P. Ferris, Kose John, Anil K. Makhija.
    其他作者: Ferris, Stephen P.
    出版者: Bingley, U.K. : : Emerald,, 2012.
    面頁冊數: 1 online resource (viii, 238 p.) : : ill.
    標題: Corporate governance.
    標題: Corporations - Finance.
    ISBN: 9781780527895 (electronic bk.)
    ISBN: 9781780527888
    內容註: SPAC performance, ownership and corporate governance / John S. Howe and Scott W. O'Brien -- Limits on convergence in international corporate governance practices / David Javakhadze, Stephen P. Ferris, Gregory Noronha -- Firm-specific factors affecting the private benefits of control in concentrated ownership economies / Ronen Barak, Beni Lauterbach -- The joint discipline of option and debt : theory and evidence from CEO's equity holding, capital structure, and executive compensation / Gang 'Nathan' Dong -- The effects of R&D expenditures on bondholders / Zhan Jiang, Kenneth A. Kim, Carl Hsin-Han Shen -- Short- and long-term share price reaction to announcements of financial restatements / Vijay Gondhalekar, Mahendra Joshi, Marie McKendall -- Government ownership, competition, and the risk-taking attitude of the GCC banking system / Ritab Al-Khouri -- CEO compensation, expropriation, and the balance of power among large shareholders / Yongli Luo, Dave O. Jackson.
    摘要、提要註: This volume contains eight empirical papers that examine corporate governance from a number of different perspectives. Howe et al investigate how governance can influence short- and long-term performance in the case of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies; Javakhadze et al analyze limits to convergence in international corporate governance practices; Barak and Lauterbach focus on the private benefits of control; and Dong examines the relation between the discipline of options and corporate debt and the design of executive compensation. Jiang et al measure the effect of R&D expenditures on bondholders; Gondhalekar et al examine the capital market response to financial restatements; Al-Khouri reports robust evidence that privately owned banks are more risky than government-owned banks; and Luo and Jackson conclude that the positive relationship between tunneling and executive compensation implies personal benefits for controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders.
    電子資源: http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1569-3732/15
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