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How Shareholder Accusations of Manag...

Jennings, Jared Nelson.

How Shareholder Accusations of Managerial Misconduct Affect Sell-side Analysts.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
書名/作者:	How Shareholder Accusations of Managerial Misconduct Affect Sell-side Analysts.
作者:	Jennings, Jared Nelson.
面頁冊數:	76 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-12(E), Section: A, page: .
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International73-12(E)A.
標題:	Business Administration, Accounting.
標題:	Business Administration, Management.
ISBN:	9781267530578
摘要、提要註:	In this paper, I examine how the firm's information environment changes after an accusation of managerial misconduct associated with management disclosure. Filing a security class action lawsuit under SEC Rule 10(b)-5 is the primary mechanism that shareholders have to formally accuse management of intentionally misrepresenting or withholding firm disclosure. After the filing of the lawsuit, investors and other market participants likely question management's credibility and the quality of its disclosure. Investors likely demand additional information from other market participants to evaluate and/or substitute for management disclosure after the lawsuit is filed. I argue that sell-side equity analysts have the expertise and incentives to produce a portion of the additional information demanded by investors after the filing of the lawsuit. Using 565 security class action lawsuits obtained from Cornerstone Research and Stanford Law School, I find evidence consistent with sell-side analysts providing more services, using more private information during the forecasting process, and having more informative reports after the filing of a security class action lawsuit.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3521680

How Shareholder Accusations of Managerial Misconduct Affect Sell-side Analysts.
Jennings, Jared Nelson.

How Shareholder Accusations of Managerial Misconduct Affect Sell-side Analysts. - 76 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-12(E), Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2012.

In this paper, I examine how the firm's information environment changes after an accusation of managerial misconduct associated with management disclosure. Filing a security class action lawsuit under SEC Rule 10(b)-5 is the primary mechanism that shareholders have to formally accuse management of intentionally misrepresenting or withholding firm disclosure. After the filing of the lawsuit, investors and other market participants likely question management's credibility and the quality of its disclosure. Investors likely demand additional information from other market participants to evaluate and/or substitute for management disclosure after the lawsuit is filed. I argue that sell-side equity analysts have the expertise and incentives to produce a portion of the additional information demanded by investors after the filing of the lawsuit. Using 565 security class action lawsuits obtained from Cornerstone Research and Stanford Law School, I find evidence consistent with sell-side analysts providing more services, using more private information during the forecasting process, and having more informative reports after the filing of a security class action lawsuit.

ISBN: 9781267530578Subjects--Topical Terms:

506782
Business Administration, Accounting.

How Shareholder Accusations of Managerial Misconduct Affect Sell-side Analysts.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-12(E), Section: A, page: .
500 $a Advisers: Dawn Matsumoto; Terry Shevlin.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2012.
520 $a In this paper, I examine how the firm's information environment changes after an accusation of managerial misconduct associated with management disclosure. Filing a security class action lawsuit under SEC Rule 10(b)-5 is the primary mechanism that shareholders have to formally accuse management of intentionally misrepresenting or withholding firm disclosure. After the filing of the lawsuit, investors and other market participants likely question management's credibility and the quality of its disclosure. Investors likely demand additional information from other market participants to evaluate and/or substitute for management disclosure after the lawsuit is filed. I argue that sell-side equity analysts have the expertise and incentives to produce a portion of the additional information demanded by investors after the filing of the lawsuit. Using 565 security class action lawsuits obtained from Cornerstone Research and Stanford Law School, I find evidence consistent with sell-side analysts providing more services, using more private information during the forecasting process, and having more informative reports after the filing of a security class action lawsuit.
590 $a School code: 0250.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Accounting. $3 506782
650 4 $a Business Administration, Management. $3 423062
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773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 73-12(E)A.
790 1 0 $a Matsumoto, Dawn, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Shevlin, Terry, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Soliman, Mark $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Karpoff, Jonathan $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Rice, Edward $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Shi, Lan $e committee member
790 $a 0250
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2012
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3521680

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