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Venture Capital Directors, Earnings Manipulation, & Firm Performance.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
書名/作者:	Venture Capital Directors, Earnings Manipulation, & Firm Performance.
作者:	Fleming, Brandon E.
面頁冊數:	96 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-08(E), Section: A, page: .
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International73-08(E)A.
標題:	Business Administration, Accounting.
標題:	Business Administration, Management.
ISBN:	9781267284921
摘要、提要註:	The accounting system allows for flexibility in how earnings are presented, and this flexibility is susceptible to the incentives for managers and controlling stakeholders. Venture Capital (VC) firms have competing incentives when it comes to bringing portfolio firms public at an initial public offering (IPO), and the power that VC directors exert over the firm allows them to control policies set by the firm, including the disclosure of earnings. VC firm investors typically do not liquidate their holdings in portfolio firms until more than a year after the IPO, which means VC directors have an incentive to bring only high quality portfolio firms public. However, VC directors also have an incentive to bring portfolio firms to market faster, i.e., to "grandstand." This dissertation looks to social networks of VC directors to explain earnings manipulation and, in turn, firm performance more than a year after IPO. My purpose is to demonstrate how social networks determine the dominating incentives and how social networks influence the relationship between earnings manipulation at IPO and firm performance more than a year afterward. The main premise of my dissertation is that embeddedness, or the degree to which individuals and organizations are connected, influences malfeasance.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3504399

Venture Capital Directors, Earnings Manipulation, & Firm Performance.
Fleming, Brandon E.

Venture Capital Directors, Earnings Manipulation, & Firm Performance. - 96 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-08(E), Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2012.

The accounting system allows for flexibility in how earnings are presented, and this flexibility is susceptible to the incentives for managers and controlling stakeholders. Venture Capital (VC) firms have competing incentives when it comes to bringing portfolio firms public at an initial public offering (IPO), and the power that VC directors exert over the firm allows them to control policies set by the firm, including the disclosure of earnings. VC firm investors typically do not liquidate their holdings in portfolio firms until more than a year after the IPO, which means VC directors have an incentive to bring only high quality portfolio firms public. However, VC directors also have an incentive to bring portfolio firms to market faster, i.e., to "grandstand." This dissertation looks to social networks of VC directors to explain earnings manipulation and, in turn, firm performance more than a year after IPO. My purpose is to demonstrate how social networks determine the dominating incentives and how social networks influence the relationship between earnings manipulation at IPO and firm performance more than a year afterward. The main premise of my dissertation is that embeddedness, or the degree to which individuals and organizations are connected, influences malfeasance.

ISBN: 9781267284921Subjects--Topical Terms:

506782
Business Administration, Accounting.

Venture Capital Directors, Earnings Manipulation, & Firm Performance.
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520 $a The accounting system allows for flexibility in how earnings are presented, and this flexibility is susceptible to the incentives for managers and controlling stakeholders. Venture Capital (VC) firms have competing incentives when it comes to bringing portfolio firms public at an initial public offering (IPO), and the power that VC directors exert over the firm allows them to control policies set by the firm, including the disclosure of earnings. VC firm investors typically do not liquidate their holdings in portfolio firms until more than a year after the IPO, which means VC directors have an incentive to bring only high quality portfolio firms public. However, VC directors also have an incentive to bring portfolio firms to market faster, i.e., to "grandstand." This dissertation looks to social networks of VC directors to explain earnings manipulation and, in turn, firm performance more than a year after IPO. My purpose is to demonstrate how social networks determine the dominating incentives and how social networks influence the relationship between earnings manipulation at IPO and firm performance more than a year afterward. The main premise of my dissertation is that embeddedness, or the degree to which individuals and organizations are connected, influences malfeasance.
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