Research in law and economics[electr...
Kirkwood, John B.

 

  • Research in law and economics[electronic resource] :a journal of policy /
  • 紀錄類型: 書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
    杜威分類號: 340.1/15
    書名/作者: Research in law and economics : a journal of policy // edited by Richard O. Zerbe, John B. Kirkwood.
    其他作者: Zerbe, Richard O.
    出版者: Bingley, U.K. : : Emerald,, 2007.
    面頁冊數: 1 online resource (257 p.).
    標題: Law - General.
    標題: Business & Economics - Economics
    標題: Jurisprudence & philosophy of law.
    標題: Economic theory & philosophy.
    標題: Trade regulation - United States.
    ISBN: 9781849504430 (electronic bk.)
    內容註: Lays vs. wages : contracting in the klondike gold rush / Douglas W. Allen -- Buyer power : economic theory and antitrust policy / Zhiqi Chen -- Generalized critical loss for market definition /Malcolm B. Coate, Mark D. Williams -- Price-fixing overcharges : legal and economic evidence / JohnM. Connor -- Predatory price cutting and standard oil : a re-examination of the trial record / James A. Dalton, Louis Esposito --On the optimal negligence standard in tort law when one party is a long-run and the other a short-run player / Henrik Lando -- Should victimsof exposure to a toxic substance have an independent claim for medicalmonitoring? / Thomas J. Miceli, Kathleen Segerson -- Marketconcentration, multi-market participation and antitrust / Dennis L. Weisman.
    摘要、提要註: Written by leading experts in the field, each chapter in this book examines in depth a topic in law and economics. John Connor begins by describing and evaluating the results of his extensive survey of reports of cartel overcharges. Dennis Weisman models the price effects of mergers that not only increase concentration in the relevant market but alsoincrease the merged firms' participation in other, complementary markets. Malcolm Coate and Mark Williams develop a superior method for calculating critical loss in markets that are relatively homogenous and competitive premerger. Zhiqi Chensurveys recent developments in economic theories of buyer power and creates a general framework forantitrust analysis. Finally Thomas J. Miceli and Kathern Segerson, given the difficulty of collecting damages after a long latency period, examine the desirability of granting toxic exposure victims an independent cause of action for medical monitoring at the time of exposure. They show that such acause of action increase incentives for injurer care but only at the cost of greater litigation cost and the reluctance of courts to adoptsuch a proposed cause of action reflect their awareness of this trade-off.
    電子資源: http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0193-5895/22
評論
Export
取書館別
 
 
變更密碼
登入