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Regard for reason in the moral mind /

May, Joshua.

Regard for reason in the moral mind /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	170
書名/作者:	Regard for reason in the moral mind // Joshua May.
作者:	May, Joshua.
出版者:	Oxford ; : Oxford University Press,, 2018.
面頁冊數:	xiii, 264 p. : : ill. ;; 25 cm.
標題:	Judgment (Ethics)
標題:	Ethics.
標題:	Reason.
ISBN:	9780198811572 (hbk.) :
書目註:	Includes bibliographical references (p. [239]-259) and index.
內容註:	Introduction. Empirical pessimism -- Part I. Moral judgment & knowledge. The limits of emotion -- Reasoning beyond consequences -- Defending moral judgment -- The difficulty of moral knowledge -- Part II. Moral motivation & virtue. Beyond self-interest -- The motivational power of moral beliefs -- Freeing reason from desire -- Defending virtuous motivation -- Conclusion. Cautious optimism.
摘要、提要註:	The burgeoning science of ethics has fostered pessimism about moral thought and action: we're told that they are driven by arbitrary factors and unreasoned feelings. Joshua May argues compellingly that this pessimism is not justified: moral judgment and motivation are fundamentally rational enterprises not beholden to the passions.

Regard for reason in the moral mind /
May, Joshua.

Regard for reason in the moral mind /Joshua May. - 1st ed. - Oxford ;Oxford University Press,2018. - xiii, 264 p. :ill. ;25 cm.

Includes bibliographical references (p. [239]-259) and index.

Introduction. Empirical pessimism -- Part I. Moral judgment & knowledge. The limits of emotion -- Reasoning beyond consequences -- Defending moral judgment -- The difficulty of moral knowledge -- Part II. Moral motivation & virtue. Beyond self-interest -- The motivational power of moral beliefs -- Freeing reason from desire -- Defending virtuous motivation -- Conclusion. Cautious optimism.

The burgeoning science of ethics has fostered pessimism about moral thought and action: we're told that they are driven by arbitrary factors and unreasoned feelings. Joshua May argues compellingly that this pessimism is not justified: moral judgment and motivation are fundamentally rational enterprises not beholden to the passions.

ISBN: 9780198811572 (hbk.) :NTD 1,923

LCCN: 2017959351

Nat. Bib. No.: GBB864902bnb

Nat. Bib. Agency Control No.: 018827703UkSubjects--Topical Terms:

434526
Judgment (Ethics)

LC Class. No.: BJ1408.5 / .M39 2018

Dewey Class. No.: 170

Regard for reason in the moral mind /
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