大葉大學圖書館 |

登入

回首頁

Escape from democracy :the role of e...

Levy, David M., (1944-)

Escape from democracy :the role of experts and the public in economic policy /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	330
書名/作者:	Escape from democracy : : the role of experts and the public in economic policy // David M. Levy, Sandra J. Peart.
作者:	Levy, David M.,
其他作者:	Peart, Sandra.
出版者:	New York, NY : : Cambridge University Press,, 2017.
面頁冊數:	xvii, 275 p. : : ill. (some col.) ;; 24 cm.
標題:	Expertise.
標題:	Political participation.
標題:	Democracy.
標題:	Economics.
標題:	Economics - Sociological aspects.
標題:	Economic policy.
ISBN:	9781107142398 (hbk.) :
ISBN:	9781316507131 (pbk.)
書目註:	Includes bibliographical references (p. 243-263) and index.
內容註:	Machine generated contents note: Acknowledgments; Part I. Introductory Themes: 1. Introduction; Part II. The Discussion Tradition: 2. On 'strongly fortified minds': self-restraint and cooperation in the discussion tradition; 3. The Knightian moment; 4. The rise of new welfare economics: an end to endogenous goals?; Part III. When Linear Models Fail: Two Cases: 5. Experts and eugenics: 'science' privileges a social goal; 6. Expert judgment and Soviet growth; Part IV. An End to Discussion: Secrecy and the Temptation to Bias: 7. Experts and the philosopher's stone: John Law's secret financial alchemy; 8. The consequence of suppressing discussion: imprudence with biased experts; Part V. Getting the Best out of Experts: 9. A revised code of ethics for experts; 10. Mitigating the consequences of factional expertise; 11. Inducing greater transparency; Part VI. Conclusion: 12. Vox populi?.
摘要、提要註:	"The orthodox view of economic policy holds that public deliberation sets the goals or ends, and then experts select the means to implement these goals. This assumes that experts are no more than trustworthy servants of the public interest. David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart examine the historical record to consider cases in which experts were trusted with disastrous results, such as eugenics, the regulatory use of security ratings, and central economic planning. This history suggests that experts have not only the public interest but also their own interests to consider. The authors then recover and extend an alternative view of economic policy that subjects experts' proposals to further discussion, resulting in transparency and ensuring that the public obtains the best insights of experts in economics while avoiding pitfalls such as expert bias"--

Escape from democracy :the role of experts and the public in economic policy /
Levy, David M.,1944-

Escape from democracy :the role of experts and the public in economic policy /David M. Levy, Sandra J. Peart. - New York, NY :Cambridge University Press,2017. - xvii, 275 p. :ill. (some col.) ;24 cm.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 243-263) and index.

Machine generated contents note: Acknowledgments; Part I. Introductory Themes: 1. Introduction; Part II. The Discussion Tradition: 2. On 'strongly fortified minds': self-restraint and cooperation in the discussion tradition; 3. The Knightian moment; 4. The rise of new welfare economics: an end to endogenous goals?; Part III. When Linear Models Fail: Two Cases: 5. Experts and eugenics: 'science' privileges a social goal; 6. Expert judgment and Soviet growth; Part IV. An End to Discussion: Secrecy and the Temptation to Bias: 7. Experts and the philosopher's stone: John Law's secret financial alchemy; 8. The consequence of suppressing discussion: imprudence with biased experts; Part V. Getting the Best out of Experts: 9. A revised code of ethics for experts; 10. Mitigating the consequences of factional expertise; 11. Inducing greater transparency; Part VI. Conclusion: 12. Vox populi?.

"The orthodox view of economic policy holds that public deliberation sets the goals or ends, and then experts select the means to implement these goals. This assumes that experts are no more than trustworthy servants of the public interest. David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart examine the historical record to consider cases in which experts were trusted with disastrous results, such as eugenics, the regulatory use of security ratings, and central economic planning. This history suggests that experts have not only the public interest but also their own interests to consider. The authors then recover and extend an alternative view of economic policy that subjects experts' proposals to further discussion, resulting in transparency and ensuring that the public obtains the best insights of experts in economics while avoiding pitfalls such as expert bias"--

ISBN: 9781107142398 (hbk.) :NTD 3,465

LCCN: 2016024201Subjects--Topical Terms:

342867
Expertise.

LC Class. No.: HB71 / .L544 2017

Dewey Class. No.: 330

Escape from democracy :the role of experts and the public in economic policy /
LDR:02456cam a2200205 a 4500 001 469503
005 20170329144633.0
008 170627s2017 nyua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2016024201
020 $a 9781107142398 (hbk.) : $c NTD 3,465
020 $a 9781316507131 (pbk.)
040 $a DLC $b eng $c DLC $d DLC $d DYU
041 0 $a eng
050 0 0 $a HB71 $b .L544 2017
082 0 0 $a 330 $2 23
100 1 $a Levy, David M., $d 1944- $e editor of compilation. $3 576283
245 1 0 $a Escape from democracy : $b the role of experts and the public in economic policy / $c David M. Levy, Sandra J. Peart.
260 $a New York, NY : $b Cambridge University Press, $c 2017.
300 $a xvii, 275 p. : $b ill. (some col.) ; $c 24 cm.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references (p. 243-263) and index.
505 8 $a Machine generated contents note: Acknowledgments; Part I. Introductory Themes: 1. Introduction; Part II. The Discussion Tradition: 2. On 'strongly fortified minds': self-restraint and cooperation in the discussion tradition; 3. The Knightian moment; 4. The rise of new welfare economics: an end to endogenous goals?; Part III. When Linear Models Fail: Two Cases: 5. Experts and eugenics: 'science' privileges a social goal; 6. Expert judgment and Soviet growth; Part IV. An End to Discussion: Secrecy and the Temptation to Bias: 7. Experts and the philosopher's stone: John Law's secret financial alchemy; 8. The consequence of suppressing discussion: imprudence with biased experts; Part V. Getting the Best out of Experts: 9. A revised code of ethics for experts; 10. Mitigating the consequences of factional expertise; 11. Inducing greater transparency; Part VI. Conclusion: 12. Vox populi?.
520 $a "The orthodox view of economic policy holds that public deliberation sets the goals or ends, and then experts select the means to implement these goals. This assumes that experts are no more than trustworthy servants of the public interest. David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart examine the historical record to consider cases in which experts were trusted with disastrous results, such as eugenics, the regulatory use of security ratings, and central economic planning. This history suggests that experts have not only the public interest but also their own interests to consider. The authors then recover and extend an alternative view of economic policy that subjects experts' proposals to further discussion, resulting in transparency and ensuring that the public obtains the best insights of experts in economics while avoiding pitfalls such as expert bias"-- $c Provided by publisher.
650 0 $a Expertise. $3 342867
650 0 $a Political participation. $3 372321
650 0 $a Democracy. $3 185242
650 0 $a Economics. $3 172164
650 0 $a Economics $x Sociological aspects. $3 410244
650 0 $a Economic policy. $3 192147
700 1 $a Peart, Sandra. $3 675648