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The varieties of self-knowledge[electronic resource] /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	126
書名/作者:	The varieties of self-knowledge/ by Annalisa Coliva.
作者:	Coliva, Annalisa.
出版者:	London : : Palgrave Macmillan UK :, 2016.
面頁冊數:	xvi, 288 p. : : digital ;; 22 cm.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Self-knowledge, Theory of.
標題:	Philosophy.
標題:	Epistemology.
標題:	Philosophy of Mind.
標題:	Emotion.
ISBN:	9781137326133
ISBN:	9781137326126
摘要、提要註:	This book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We "know ourselves" through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call "self-knowledge" is not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts. This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the epistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such as inner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such as transparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well as expressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative "pluralist" position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of the phenomenon and its resistance to any "monistic" treatment, to pose new and intriguing philosophical challenges.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-32613-3

The varieties of self-knowledge[electronic resource] /
Coliva, Annalisa.

The varieties of self-knowledge[electronic resource] /by Annalisa Coliva. - London :Palgrave Macmillan UK :2016. - xvi, 288 p. :digital ;22 cm. - Palgrave innovations in philosophy. - Palgrave innovations in philosophy..

This book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We "know ourselves" through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call "self-knowledge" is not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts. This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the epistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such as inner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such as transparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well as expressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative "pluralist" position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of the phenomenon and its resistance to any "monistic" treatment, to pose new and intriguing philosophical challenges.

ISBN: 9781137326133

Standard No.: 10.1057/978-1-137-32613-3doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

436665
Self-knowledge, Theory of.

LC Class. No.: BD438.5 / .C65 2016

Dewey Class. No.: 126

The varieties of self-knowledge[electronic resource] /
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