Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Eff...
Rao, T.V.S. Ramamohan.

 

  • Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation[electronic resource] /
  • 紀錄類型: 書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
    杜威分類號: 338.5
    書名/作者: Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation/ by T.V.S. Ramamohan Rao.
    作者: Rao, T.V.S. Ramamohan.
    出版者: New Delhi : : Springer India :, 2016.
    面頁冊數: xvii, 293 p. : : ill., digital ;; 24 cm.
    Contained By: Springer eBooks
    標題: Risk - Mathematical models.
    標題: Risk management.
    標題: Macroeconomics.
    標題: Economics.
    標題: Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics.
    標題: Microeconomics.
    標題: R & D/Technology Policy.
    標題: Finance, general.
    標題: Industrial Organization.
    ISBN: 9788132225621
    ISBN: 9788132225614
    內容註: 1. Introduction -- 2. Conferences and Publications -- 3. Knowledge Intensity and Risk sharing -- 4. Information Asymmetry -- 5. Technology Transfer -- 6. Equity Participation -- 7. Cost Sharing -- 8. Warranties and Risk Sharing -- 9. Accident and Health Insurance -- 10. Securitization and Volatility -- 11. Foreign Institutional Investors and Regulatory Diligence -- 12. Financial Crisis and Regulatory Policy -- 13. Estimating the Parameters -- 14. Conclusion.
    摘要、提要註: The book provides an integrated approach to risk sharing, risk spreading and efficient regulation through principal agent models. It emphasizes the role of information asymmetry and risk sharing in contracts as an alternative to transaction cost considerations. It examines how contracting, as an institutional mechanism to conduct transactions, spreads risks while attempting consolidation. It further highlights the shifting emphasis in contracts from Coasian transaction cost saving to risk sharing and shows how it creates difficulties associated with risk spreading, and emphasizes the need for efficient regulation of contracts at various levels. Each of the chapters is structured using a principal agent model, and all chapters incorporate adverse selection (and exogenous randomness) as a result of information asymmetry, as well as moral hazard (and endogenous randomness) due to the self-interest-seeking behavior on the part of the participants.
    電子資源: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2562-1
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