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The limits of Leviathan :contract theory and the enforcement of International Law /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	341
書名/作者:	The limits of Leviathan : : contract theory and the enforcement of International Law // Robert E. Scott, Paul B. Stephan.
作者:	Scott, Robert E.,
其他作者:	Stephan, Paul B.,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (viii, 255 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Executions (Law)
標題:	International and municipal law.
標題:	Treaties.
標題:	Breach of contract.
ISBN:	9780511511370 (ebook)
內容註:	States, firms and the enforcement of international law -- Lessons from contract theory -- A model of optimal enforcement -- Patterns of international law enforcement -- The choice between formal and informal enforcement -- The future of international law enforcement.
摘要、提要註:	Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511511370

The limits of Leviathan :contract theory and the enforcement of International Law /
Scott, Robert E.,1944-

The limits of Leviathan :contract theory and the enforcement of International Law /Robert E. Scott, Paul B. Stephan. - 1 online resource (viii, 255 pages) :digital, PDF file(s).

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

States, firms and the enforcement of international law -- Lessons from contract theory -- A model of optimal enforcement -- Patterns of international law enforcement -- The choice between formal and informal enforcement -- The future of international law enforcement.

Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments.

ISBN: 9780511511370 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

645154
Executions (Law)

LC Class. No.: K2330 / .S36 2006

Dewey Class. No.: 341

The limits of Leviathan :contract theory and the enforcement of International Law /
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