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Designing federalism :a theory of se...

Filippov, Mikhail,

Designing federalism :a theory of self-sustainable federal institutions /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	321.02/3
書名/作者:	Designing federalism : : a theory of self-sustainable federal institutions // Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, Olga Shvetsova.
作者:	Filippov, Mikhail,
其他作者:	Ordeshook, Peter C.,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xii, 384 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Federal government.
標題:	Comparative government.
標題:	World politics - 1989-
ISBN:	9780511610875 (ebook)
摘要、提要註:	Because of the redistributive nature of institutions and the availability of implementable alternatives with different distributive consequences, the desire of federation members to change institutional specifics in their favor is a permanent feature of the federal political process. This is so for two reasons. First, states or their equivalents in democratic federations usually can succeed in renegotiating the rules if they feel sufficiently motivated to do so. Second, in the case of a federation it is more or less clear who stands to benefit from any change in institutions. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy at the popular and elite levels cannot be taken for granted. The authors show that the presence in the political process of agents who are 'naturally committed' to the status-quo institutional arrangement can suffice to coordinate voters to act as if they support existing constitutional arrangements.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610875

Designing federalism :a theory of self-sustainable federal institutions /
Filippov, Mikhail,

Designing federalism :a theory of self-sustainable federal institutions /Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, Olga Shvetsova. - 1 online resource (xii, 384 pages) :digital, PDF file(s).

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Because of the redistributive nature of institutions and the availability of implementable alternatives with different distributive consequences, the desire of federation members to change institutional specifics in their favor is a permanent feature of the federal political process. This is so for two reasons. First, states or their equivalents in democratic federations usually can succeed in renegotiating the rules if they feel sufficiently motivated to do so. Second, in the case of a federation it is more or less clear who stands to benefit from any change in institutions. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy at the popular and elite levels cannot be taken for granted. The authors show that the presence in the political process of agents who are 'naturally committed' to the status-quo institutional arrangement can suffice to coordinate voters to act as if they support existing constitutional arrangements.

ISBN: 9780511610875 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

380822
Federal government.

LC Class. No.: JC355 / .F55 2004

Dewey Class. No.: 321.02/3

Designing federalism :a theory of self-sustainable federal institutions /
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