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Perfect deterrence /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	355.02/17
書名/作者:	Perfect deterrence // Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour.
作者:	Zagare, Frank C.,
其他作者:	Kilgour, D. Marc,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xxii, 414 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Deterrence (Strategy)
ISBN:	9780511491788 (ebook)
內容註:	Classical deterrence theory -- Rationality and deterrence -- Credibility and deterrence -- Uncertainty and mutual deterrence -- Unilateral deterrence -- Modeling extended deterrence -- Modeling massive retaliation -- Modeling flexible response -- Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence -- Perfect deterrence theory.
摘要、提要註:	An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491788

Perfect deterrence /
Zagare, Frank C.,

Perfect deterrence /Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour. - 1 online resource (xxii, 414 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). - Cambridge studies in international relations ;72. - Cambridge studies in international relations ;106..

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Classical deterrence theory -- Rationality and deterrence -- Credibility and deterrence -- Uncertainty and mutual deterrence -- Unilateral deterrence -- Modeling extended deterrence -- Modeling massive retaliation -- Modeling flexible response -- Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence -- Perfect deterrence theory.

An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject.

ISBN: 9780511491788 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

378934
Deterrence (Strategy)

LC Class. No.: U162.6 / .Z34 2000

Dewey Class. No.: 355.02/17

Perfect deterrence /
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