大葉大學圖書館 |

Fellow-feeling and the moral life /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	171/.2
書名/作者:	Fellow-feeling and the moral life // Joseph Duke FiIonowicz.
其他題名:	Fellow-Feeling & the Moral Life
作者:	Filonowicz, Joseph Duke,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xi, 248 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Ethics - History - 18th century. - Great Britain
ISBN:	9780511487170 (ebook)
內容註:	Fellow-feeling and ethical theory : the British sentimentalists -- The school of sentiment -- Two conceptions of the moral -- Morality in the open street -- A formidable ghost : the Sage of Malmesbury -- Moral theory and moral advice -- Designs of remaining chapters -- Ethical sentimentalism revisited -- Statement of the argument -- Ethical rationalism -- Shaftesbury's ethical sentimentalism -- Sentimentalism and rationalism -- Objections to sentimentalism -- Shaftesbury's ethical system -- Shaftesbury as moralist -- The good -- Obligation -- Disinterestedness -- Why should I be moral? -- Shaftesbury's moral sense -- The limits of Shaftesburyan sentimentalism -- Hutcheson's moral sense -- A sad tale? -- Hutcheson's moral sense -- Four naïve questions concerning moral sense -- What do we perceive by moral sense? -- Three received views -- Defining Hutcheson's moral "realism" -- Charting the return journey -- Hutcheson's "offensive" argument against ethical rationalism -- C.D. Broad's defense of moral sense theories in ethics -- "Some reflections" -- The subjective theory -- Analysis part 1 : why moral sense theory is sentimentalistic -- Analysis part 2 : subjectivism versus naturalism, or, are ethical propositions statistical? -- Broad's defense, (almost) concluded -- Broad's offensive argument against ethical rationalism -- What is innate in moral sense? -- Moral sense theory : Hutcheson, Broad and beyond -- James W. Wilson's The moral sense -- How do very young children come to approve (and disapprove)? occultism versus obscurantism -- The "hyperoffensive" argument against ethical rationalism -- Ideas without will -- Postscript : Hume, Smith and the end of the sentimental school.
摘要、提要註:	How do our feelings for others shape our attitudes and conduct towards them? Is morality primarily a matter of rational choice, or instinctual feeling? Joseph Duke Filonowicz takes the reader on an engaging, informative tour of some of the main issues in philosophical ethics, explaining and defending the ideas of the early-modern British sentimentalists. These philosophers - Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith - argued that it is our feelings, and not our 'reason', which ultimately determine how we judge what is good or bad, right or wrong, and how we choose to act towards our fellow human beings. Filonowicz draws on contemporary sociology and evolutionary biology as well as present-day moral theory to examine and defend the sentimentalist view and to challenge the rationalistic character of contemporary ethics. His book will appeal to readers interested in both the history of philosophy and current ethical debates.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487170

Fellow-feeling and the moral life /
Filonowicz, Joseph Duke,

Fellow-feeling and the moral life /Fellow-Feeling & the Moral LifeJoseph Duke FiIonowicz. - 1 online resource (xi, 248 pages) :digital, PDF file(s).

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Fellow-feeling and ethical theory : the British sentimentalists -- The school of sentiment -- Two conceptions of the moral -- Morality in the open street -- A formidable ghost : the Sage of Malmesbury -- Moral theory and moral advice -- Designs of remaining chapters -- Ethical sentimentalism revisited -- Statement of the argument -- Ethical rationalism -- Shaftesbury's ethical sentimentalism -- Sentimentalism and rationalism -- Objections to sentimentalism -- Shaftesbury's ethical system -- Shaftesbury as moralist -- The good -- Obligation -- Disinterestedness -- Why should I be moral? -- Shaftesbury's moral sense -- The limits of Shaftesburyan sentimentalism -- Hutcheson's moral sense -- A sad tale? -- Hutcheson's moral sense -- Four naïve questions concerning moral sense -- What do we perceive by moral sense? -- Three received views -- Defining Hutcheson's moral "realism" -- Charting the return journey -- Hutcheson's "offensive" argument against ethical rationalism -- C.D. Broad's defense of moral sense theories in ethics -- "Some reflections" -- The subjective theory -- Analysis part 1 : why moral sense theory is sentimentalistic -- Analysis part 2 : subjectivism versus naturalism, or, are ethical propositions statistical? -- Broad's defense, (almost) concluded -- Broad's offensive argument against ethical rationalism -- What is innate in moral sense? -- Moral sense theory : Hutcheson, Broad and beyond -- James W. Wilson's The moral sense -- How do very young children come to approve (and disapprove)? occultism versus obscurantism -- The "hyperoffensive" argument against ethical rationalism -- Ideas without will -- Postscript : Hume, Smith and the end of the sentimental school.

How do our feelings for others shape our attitudes and conduct towards them? Is morality primarily a matter of rational choice, or instinctual feeling? Joseph Duke Filonowicz takes the reader on an engaging, informative tour of some of the main issues in philosophical ethics, explaining and defending the ideas of the early-modern British sentimentalists. These philosophers - Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith - argued that it is our feelings, and not our 'reason', which ultimately determine how we judge what is good or bad, right or wrong, and how we choose to act towards our fellow human beings. Filonowicz draws on contemporary sociology and evolutionary biology as well as present-day moral theory to examine and defend the sentimentalist view and to challenge the rationalistic character of contemporary ethics. His book will appeal to readers interested in both the history of philosophy and current ethical debates.

ISBN: 9780511487170 (ebook)Subjects--Personal Names:

414890
Hutcheson, Francis,
1694-1746.Subjects--Topical Terms:

414892
Ethics
--History--Great Britain--18th century.

LC Class. No.: BJ602 / .F55 2008

Dewey Class. No.: 171/.2

Fellow-feeling and the moral life /
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520 $a How do our feelings for others shape our attitudes and conduct towards them? Is morality primarily a matter of rational choice, or instinctual feeling? Joseph Duke Filonowicz takes the reader on an engaging, informative tour of some of the main issues in philosophical ethics, explaining and defending the ideas of the early-modern British sentimentalists. These philosophers - Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith - argued that it is our feelings, and not our 'reason', which ultimately determine how we judge what is good or bad, right or wrong, and how we choose to act towards our fellow human beings. Filonowicz draws on contemporary sociology and evolutionary biology as well as present-day moral theory to examine and defend the sentimentalist view and to challenge the rationalistic character of contemporary ethics. His book will appeal to readers interested in both the history of philosophy and current ethical debates.
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