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Delegation and Agency in Internation...

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Delegation and Agency in International Organizations.[electronic resource].

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
[NT 15000414]:	341.2
Title/Author:	Delegation and Agency in International Organizations.
Author:	Hawkins, Darren G.
other author:	Lake, David A.
Published:	Leiden : : Cambridge University Press,, 2006.
Description:	426 p.
Subject:	International organization.
ISBN:	9780511491368 (electronic bk.)
ISBN:	9780521680462 (print)
[NT 15000228]:	Contents; Figures; Tables; Notes on contributors; Preface; 1 Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory; 2 Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid; 3 US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy; 4 Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems; 5 Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality; 6 Delegation and discretion in the European Union; 7 How agents matter
[NT 15000229]:	Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracies are very similar to those faced in domestic politics.
Online resource:	Click here to view book

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations.[electronic resource].
Hawkins, Darren G.

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations.[electronic resource]. - Leiden :Cambridge University Press,2006. - 426 p.

Contents; Figures; Tables; Notes on contributors; Preface; 1 Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory; 2 Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid; 3 US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy; 4 Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems; 5 Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality; 6 Delegation and discretion in the European Union; 7 How agents matter

Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracies are very similar to those faced in domestic politics.

Electronic reproduction.

Available via World Wide Web.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

ISBN: 9780511491368 (electronic bk.)Subjects--Topical Terms:

340653
International organization.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

336502
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: JZ5566 .D45 2006eb

Dewey Class. No.: 341.2

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations.[electronic resource].
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020 $a 9780511491368 (electronic bk.)
020 $a 9780521680462 (print)
035 $a EBL281705
035 $a EBL281705
040 $a AU-PeEL $c AU-PeEL $d AU-PeEL
050 0 0 $a JZ5566 .D45 2006eb
082 0 0 $a 341.2 $a 352.3/6
100 1 $a Hawkins, Darren G. $3 566898
245 1 0 $a Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. $h [electronic resource].
260 $a Leiden : $b Cambridge University Press, $c 2006.
300 $a 426 p.
505 0 $a Contents; Figures; Tables; Notes on contributors; Preface; 1 Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory; 2 Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid; 3 US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy; 4 Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems; 5 Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality; 6 Delegation and discretion in the European Union; 7 How agents matter
505 8 $a 8 Screening power: international organizations as informative agents9 Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO; 10 Delegating IMF conditionality: understanding variations in control and conformity; 11 Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power; 12 The logic of delegation to international organizations; References; Index
520 $a Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracies are very similar to those faced in domestic politics.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $n Available via World Wide Web.
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web.
650 4 $a International organization. $3 340653
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 336502
700 1 $a Lake, David A. $3 566899
700 1 $a Nielson, Daniel L. $3 566900
700 1 $a Tierney, Michael J. $3 566901
710 2 $a Ebooks Corporation. $3 380544
776 1 $z 9780521680462
856 4 0 $z Click here to view book $u http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9780511491368

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