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Understanding general deterrence[electronic resource] :theory and application /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	355.02
書名/作者:	Understanding general deterrence : theory and application // Stephen L. Quackenbush.
作者:	Quackenbush, Stephen L.
出版者:	New York : : Palgrave Macmillan,, 2011.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xii, 208 p.) : : ill.
標題:	Conflict management.
標題:	Deterrence (Strategy)
標題:	International relations - Mathematical models.
標題:	Game theory.
標題:	POLITICAL SCIENCE - International Relations
標題:	POLITICAL SCIENCE - History & Theory.
標題:	POLITICAL SCIENCE - Political Freedom & Security
標題:	HISTORY / Military / Other
標題:	TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING / Military Science
ISBN:	9780230370791 (electronic bk.)
ISBN:	0230370799 (electronic bk.)
書目註:	Includes bibliographical references (p. [189]-201) and index.
內容註:	Purpose and Method -- General Deterrence Case Selection -- Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory -- Three-Party Extended Deterrence -- Settlements, Deterrence, and Recurrent Conflict -- Appendix 1: FORTRAN Program Used to Determine Active Dyads -- Appendix 2: Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game -- Appendix 3: Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game.
摘要、提要註:	This book bridges the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically testing and extending perfect deterrence theory. The author focuses on general deterrence, which relates to managing relations between states at all times, not only during crises. This distinction is important because understanding general deterrence is more important than understanding immediate deterrence, and because empirical analyses of immediate deterrence can be misleading due to selection effects. In a series of formal and quantitative analyses, the author tests perfect deterrence theory, applies the theory to explain recurrent conflict, and develops a new three-party game of extended deterrence.
電子資源:	http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doifinder/10.1057/9780230370791

Understanding general deterrence[electronic resource] :theory and application /
Quackenbush, Stephen L.

Understanding general deterrencetheory and application /[electronic resource] :Stephen L. Quackenbush. - 1st ed. - New York :Palgrave Macmillan,2011. - 1 online resource (xii, 208 p.) :ill.

Includes bibliographical references (p. [189]-201) and index.

Purpose and Method -- General Deterrence Case Selection -- Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory -- Three-Party Extended Deterrence -- Settlements, Deterrence, and Recurrent Conflict -- Appendix 1: FORTRAN Program Used to Determine Active Dyads -- Appendix 2: Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game -- Appendix 3: Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game.

This book bridges the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically testing and extending perfect deterrence theory. The author focuses on general deterrence, which relates to managing relations between states at all times, not only during crises. This distinction is important because understanding general deterrence is more important than understanding immediate deterrence, and because empirical analyses of immediate deterrence can be misleading due to selection effects. In a series of formal and quantitative analyses, the author tests perfect deterrence theory, applies the theory to explain recurrent conflict, and develops a new three-party game of extended deterrence.

ISBN: 9780230370791 (electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 9786613381811

Source: 566196Palgrave Macmillanhttp://www.palgraveconnect.comSubjects--Topical Terms:

179020
Conflict management.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

336502
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: JZ6368 / .Q33 2011

Dewey Class. No.: 355.02

Understanding general deterrence[electronic resource] :theory and application /
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245 1 0 $a Understanding general deterrence $h [electronic resource] : $b theory and application / $c Stephen L. Quackenbush.
250 $a 1st ed.
260 $a New York : $b Palgrave Macmillan, $c 2011.
300 $a 1 online resource (xii, 208 p.) : $b ill.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references (p. [189]-201) and index.
505 0 $a Purpose and Method -- General Deterrence Case Selection -- Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory -- Three-Party Extended Deterrence -- Settlements, Deterrence, and Recurrent Conflict -- Appendix 1: FORTRAN Program Used to Determine Active Dyads -- Appendix 2: Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game -- Appendix 3: Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game.
505 0 $a Understanding general deterrence -- General deterrence case selection -- Testing perfect deterrence theory -- Three-party extended deterrence -- Settlements, deterrence, and recurrent conflict -- Appendix 1: FORTRAN program used to determine active dyads -- Appendix 2: Subgame perfect equilibria of three-party extended deterrence game -- Appendix 3: Perfect Bayesian equilibria of three-party extended deterrence game.
520 $a This book bridges the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically testing and extending perfect deterrence theory. The author focuses on general deterrence, which relates to managing relations between states at all times, not only during crises. This distinction is important because understanding general deterrence is more important than understanding immediate deterrence, and because empirical analyses of immediate deterrence can be misleading due to selection effects. In a series of formal and quantitative analyses, the author tests perfect deterrence theory, applies the theory to explain recurrent conflict, and develops a new three-party game of extended deterrence.
520 $a "This book bridges the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically testing and extending perfect deterrence theory. The author focuses on general deterrence, which relates to managing relations between states at all times, not only during crises. This distinction is important because understanding general deterrence is more important than understanding immediate deterrence, and because empirical analyses of immediate deterrence can be misleading due to selection effects. In a series of formal and quantitative analyses, the author tests perfect deterrence theory, applies the theory to explain recurrent conflict, and develops a new three-party game of extended deterrence."--Provided by publisher.
588 $a Description based on print version record.
650 0 $a Conflict management. $3 179020
650 0 $a Deterrence (Strategy) $3 378934
650 0 $a International relations $x Mathematical models. $3 473855
650 0 $a Game theory. $3 217795
650 7 $a POLITICAL SCIENCE $x International Relations $x General. $2 bisacsh $3 473529
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650 7 $a POLITICAL SCIENCE $x Political Freedom & Security $x International Security. $2 bisacsh $3 473528
650 7 $a HISTORY / Military / Other $2 bisacsh $3 473531
650 7 $a TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING / Military Science $2 bisacsh $3 473532
655 4 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 336502
776 0 8 $i Print version: $a Quackenbush, Stephen L. $t Understanding general deterrence. $b 1st ed. $d New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 $z 9780230115040 $w (DLC) 2011017517 $w (OCoLC)704384760
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