大葉大學圖書館 |

Corporate governance and finance[electronic resource] /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	658.15
書名/作者:	Corporate governance and finance/ edited byMark Hirschey, Kose John,Anil Makhija.
其他作者:	Hirschey, Mark.
出版者:	Amsterdam ; : JAI,, 2003.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (viii, 193 p.) : : ill.
標題:	Corporations - Finance.
標題:	Corporate governance.
標題:	Business & Economics - Corporate Finance.
標題:	Business & Economics - Finance.
標題:	Corporate finance.
標題:	Politics & government.
ISBN:	9781849502146 (electronic bk.)
書目註:	Includes bibliographical references.
內容註:	Bank monitoring, firm performance, and top management turnover in Japan / Christopher W. Anderson, Terry L. Campbell, Narayanan Jayaraman, Gershon N. Mandelker -- Ownership structure and shareholder voting on board structure changes / Teresa A. John, Gopala K. Vasudevan -- Did earnings management contribute to the overvaluation of Enron's stock? / John D. Martin, Akin Sayrak -- Operational risk in financial service providers and the proposed Basel Capital Accord : an overview / Jeffry M. Netter, Annette B. Poulsen -- Auditor resignations, litigation risk and litigation experience / Susan Scholz -- Corporate governance in Singapore : the impact of directors' equity ownership / Gurmeet S. Bhabra, Stephen P. Ferris, Nilanjan Sen, Peng Peck Yen -- Method-of-payment choicefor international targets / Kathleen P. Fuller, Michael B. Glatzer -- Organization structure and corporate governance : a survey / Mark Hirschey.
摘要、提要註:	Papers in this volume focus upon corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps the corporation effectively manage, administer and direct economic resources. Questions of what and how to produce become equally important as organizations strive to betterserve demanding customers. As a result, the design and control of effective organizations structure has been described by the vertical and horizontal relationships among the firm, its customers and suppliers. More recently, researchers have come to understand that the efficiency of firms depends upon the ability of participants to find effective means to minimize the transaction costs of coordinating productive activity. As financial economists have learned, resource allocation will be efficient so long as transaction costs remain low and property rights can befreely assigned and exchanged. An important problem that must be addressed is the so-called agency problem resulting from the natural conflict between owners and managers. Agency costs are the explicit and implicit transaction costs necessary toovercome the natural divergence of interest between agent managers and principal stockholders. The value-maximizing organization design minimizes unproductive conflict within the firm. Papers in thisvolume show how corporate control mechanisms inside and outside the firm have evolved to allocate decision authority to that person or organization best able to perform a given task.
電子資源:	http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1569-3732/8

Corporate governance and finance[electronic resource] /
Corporate governance and finance[electronic resource] /edited byMark Hirschey, Kose John,Anil Makhija. - 1st ed. - Amsterdam ;JAI,2003. - 1 online resource (viii, 193 p.) :ill. - Advances in financial economics,v. 81569-3732 ;. - Advances in financial economics ;v. 10..

Includes bibliographical references.

Bank monitoring, firm performance, and top management turnover in Japan / Christopher W. Anderson, Terry L. Campbell, Narayanan Jayaraman, Gershon N. Mandelker -- Ownership structure and shareholder voting on board structure changes / Teresa A. John, Gopala K. Vasudevan -- Did earnings management contribute to the overvaluation of Enron's stock? / John D. Martin, Akin Sayrak -- Operational risk in financial service providers and the proposed Basel Capital Accord : an overview / Jeffry M. Netter, Annette B. Poulsen -- Auditor resignations, litigation risk and litigation experience / Susan Scholz -- Corporate governance in Singapore : the impact of directors' equity ownership / Gurmeet S. Bhabra, Stephen P. Ferris, Nilanjan Sen, Peng Peck Yen -- Method-of-payment choicefor international targets / Kathleen P. Fuller, Michael B. Glatzer -- Organization structure and corporate governance : a survey / Mark Hirschey.

Papers in this volume focus upon corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps the corporation effectively manage, administer and direct economic resources. Questions of what and how to produce become equally important as organizations strive to betterserve demanding customers. As a result, the design and control of effective organizations structure has been described by the vertical and horizontal relationships among the firm, its customers and suppliers. More recently, researchers have come to understand that the efficiency of firms depends upon the ability of participants to find effective means to minimize the transaction costs of coordinating productive activity. As financial economists have learned, resource allocation will be efficient so long as transaction costs remain low and property rights can befreely assigned and exchanged. An important problem that must be addressed is the so-called agency problem resulting from the natural conflict between owners and managers. Agency costs are the explicit and implicit transaction costs necessary toovercome the natural divergence of interest between agent managers and principal stockholders. The value-maximizing organization design minimizes unproductive conflict within the firm. Papers in thisvolume show how corporate control mechanisms inside and outside the firm have evolved to allocate decision authority to that person or organization best able to perform a given task.

LCCN: 2004296234Subjects--Topical Terms:

337377
Corporations
--Finance.

LC Class. No.: HG4026 / .C647 2003

Dewey Class. No.: 658.15

Corporate governance and finance[electronic resource] /
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