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The theory of extensive form games[e...
~
Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.
The theory of extensive form games[electronic resource] /
紀錄類型:
書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:
330.015193
書名/作者:
The theory of extensive form games/ by Carlos Alos-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger.
作者:
Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.
其他作者:
Ritzberger, Klaus.
出版者:
Berlin, Heidelberg : : Springer Berlin Heidelberg :, 2016.
面頁冊數:
xv, 239 p. : : ill., digital ;; 25 cm.
Contained By:
Springer eBooks
標題:
Economics, Mathematical.
標題:
Game theory.
標題:
Economics.
標題:
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.
標題:
Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
ISBN:
9783662499443
ISBN:
9783662499429
內容註:
Introduction -- Game Trees -- Pseudotrees and Order Theory -- Extensive Decision Problems -- Extensive Forms -- Discrete Extensive Forms -- Equilibrium -- A Mathematical Appendix.
摘要、提要註:
This book treats extensive form game theory in full generality. It provides a framework that does not rely on any finiteness assumptions at all, yet covers the finite case. The presentation starts by identifying the appropriate concept of a game tree. This concept represents a synthesis of earlier approaches, including the graph-theoretical and the decision-theoretical ones. It then provides a general model of sequential, interpersonal decision making, called extensive decision problems. Extensive forms are a special case thereof, which is such that all strategy profiles induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Requiring the existence of immediate predecessors yields discrete extensive forms, which are still general enough to cover almost all applications. The treatment culminates in a characterization of the topologies on the plays of the game tree that admit equilibrium analysis.
電子資源:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49944-3
The theory of extensive form games[electronic resource] /
Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.
The theory of extensive form games
[electronic resource] /by Carlos Alos-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger. - Berlin, Heidelberg :Springer Berlin Heidelberg :2016. - xv, 239 p. :ill., digital ;25 cm. - Springer series in game theory, official series of the game theory society,1868-517X. - Springer series in game theory, official series of the game theory society..
Introduction -- Game Trees -- Pseudotrees and Order Theory -- Extensive Decision Problems -- Extensive Forms -- Discrete Extensive Forms -- Equilibrium -- A Mathematical Appendix.
This book treats extensive form game theory in full generality. It provides a framework that does not rely on any finiteness assumptions at all, yet covers the finite case. The presentation starts by identifying the appropriate concept of a game tree. This concept represents a synthesis of earlier approaches, including the graph-theoretical and the decision-theoretical ones. It then provides a general model of sequential, interpersonal decision making, called extensive decision problems. Extensive forms are a special case thereof, which is such that all strategy profiles induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Requiring the existence of immediate predecessors yields discrete extensive forms, which are still general enough to cover almost all applications. The treatment culminates in a characterization of the topologies on the plays of the game tree that admit equilibrium analysis.
ISBN: 9783662499443
Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-662-49944-3doiSubjects--Topical Terms:
227334
Economics, Mathematical.
LC Class. No.: HB144 / .A46 2016
Dewey Class. No.: 330.015193
The theory of extensive form games[electronic resource] /
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