大葉大學圖書館 |

登入

回首頁

Fair queueing[electronic resource] /

Chun, Youngsub.

Fair queueing[electronic resource] /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	519.82
書名/作者:	Fair queueing/ by Youngsub Chun.
作者:	Chun, Youngsub.
出版者:	Cham : : Springer International Publishing :, 2016.
面頁冊數:	xi, 157 p. : : ill., digital ;; 24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Queuing theory.
標題:	Economics.
標題:	Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.
標題:	Operation Research/Decision Theory.
標題:	Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
標題:	Operations Research, Management Science.
ISBN:	9783319337715
ISBN:	9783319337708
內容註:	Introduction -- Basic Concepts -- Cooperative Game Theoretic Approach -- Independence, Monotonicity, and Balanced Consistency -- No-envy -- Startegyproofness -- Strategyproofness and Egalitarian Equivalence -- Subgroup Additivity -- A Non-Cooperative Approach -- Queueing Problems with Two.
摘要、提要註:	This monograph provides a detailed analysis on fair queueing rules from a normative, a strategic, and a non-cooperative viewpoint. The queueing problem is concerned with the following situation: There is a group of agents who must be served in a facility. The facility can handle only one agent at a time and agents incur waiting costs. The problem is to find the order in which to serve agents and monetary transfers they should receive. The queueing problem has been studied extensively in the recent literature.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33771-5

Fair queueing[electronic resource] /
Chun, Youngsub.

Fair queueing[electronic resource] /by Youngsub Chun. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2016. - xi, 157 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Studies in choice and welfare,1614-0311. - Studies in choice and welfare..

Introduction -- Basic Concepts -- Cooperative Game Theoretic Approach -- Independence, Monotonicity, and Balanced Consistency -- No-envy -- Startegyproofness -- Strategyproofness and Egalitarian Equivalence -- Subgroup Additivity -- A Non-Cooperative Approach -- Queueing Problems with Two.

This monograph provides a detailed analysis on fair queueing rules from a normative, a strategic, and a non-cooperative viewpoint. The queueing problem is concerned with the following situation: There is a group of agents who must be served in a facility. The facility can handle only one agent at a time and agents incur waiting costs. The problem is to find the order in which to serve agents and monetary transfers they should receive. The queueing problem has been studied extensively in the recent literature.

ISBN: 9783319337715

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-33771-5doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

405472
Queuing theory.

LC Class. No.: T57.9 / .C48 2016

Dewey Class. No.: 519.82

Fair queueing[electronic resource] /
LDR:01756nmm a2200325 a 4500 001 458644
003 DE-He213
005 20161122141329.0
006 m d
007 cr nn 008maaau
008 170113s2016 gw s 0 eng d
020 $a 9783319337715 $q (electronic bk.)
020 $a 9783319337708 $q (paper)
024 7 $a 10.1007/978-3-319-33771-5 $2 doi
035 $a 978-3-319-33771-5
040 $a GP $c GP
041 0 $a eng
050 4 $a T57.9 $b .C48 2016
072 7 $a KCA $2 bicssc
072 7 $a BUS069030 $2 bisacsh
082 0 4 $a 519.82 $2 23
090 $a T57.9 $b .C559 2016
100 1 $a Chun, Youngsub. $3 659968
245 1 0 $a Fair queueing $h [electronic resource] / $c by Youngsub Chun.
260 $a Cham : $b Springer International Publishing : $b Imprint: Springer, $c 2016.
300 $a xi, 157 p. : $b ill., digital ; $c 24 cm.
490 1 $a Studies in choice and welfare, $x 1614-0311
505 0 $a Introduction -- Basic Concepts -- Cooperative Game Theoretic Approach -- Independence, Monotonicity, and Balanced Consistency -- No-envy -- Startegyproofness -- Strategyproofness and Egalitarian Equivalence -- Subgroup Additivity -- A Non-Cooperative Approach -- Queueing Problems with Two.
520 $a This monograph provides a detailed analysis on fair queueing rules from a normative, a strategic, and a non-cooperative viewpoint. The queueing problem is concerned with the following situation: There is a group of agents who must be served in a facility. The facility can handle only one agent at a time and agents incur waiting costs. The problem is to find the order in which to serve agents and monetary transfers they should receive. The queueing problem has been studied extensively in the recent literature.
650 0 $a Queuing theory. $3 405472
650 1 4 $a Economics. $3 172164
650 2 4 $a Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. $3 634752
650 2 4 $a Operation Research/Decision Theory. $3 511310
650 2 4 $a Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences. $3 464103
650 2 4 $a Operations Research, Management Science. $3 463666
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 463450
773 0 $t Springer eBooks
830 0 $a Studies in choice and welfare. $3 466705
856 4 0 $u http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33771-5
950 $a Economics and Finance (Springer-41170)

筆 0 讀者評論

多媒體

多媒體檔案
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33771-5

評論

新增評論分享你的心得

Export

取書館別