大葉大學圖書館 |

Social norms, bounded rationality and optimal contracts[electronic resource] /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	330.019
書名/作者:	Social norms, bounded rationality and optimal contracts/ by Suren Basov.
作者:	Basov, Suren.
出版者:	Singapore : : Springer Singapore :, 2016.
面頁冊數:	ix, 176 p. : : ill., digital ;; 24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Contracts - Economic aspects.
標題:	Economics - Psychological aspects.
標題:	Economics - Sociological aspects.
標題:	Rational expectations (Economic theory)
標題:	Social norms - Economic aspects.
標題:	Economics.
標題:	Behavioral/Experimental Economics.
ISBN:	9789811010415
ISBN:	9789811010392
內容註:	Chapter 1 Preface -- Part I Mechanism Design under Bounded Rationality -- Chapter 2 Introduction -- Chapter 3 Complexity constraints and mechanism design -- Chapter 4 Learning, probabilistic choice, and mechanism design -- Chapter 5 Some other models of mechanism design under bounded rationality -- Chapter 6 Conclusions -- Part II Social Norms and Mechanism Design -- Chapter 7 Peer Pressure and Agency Relationship -- Chapter 8 Statistical Mechanics of High Performing Working Systems -- Chapter 9 Optimal contracting in social environment -- Part III Lessons learnt and directions for future research.
摘要、提要註:	This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation. Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design. This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5

Social norms, bounded rationality and optimal contracts[electronic resource] /
Basov, Suren.

Social norms, bounded rationality and optimal contracts[electronic resource] /by Suren Basov. - Singapore :Springer Singapore :2016. - ix, 176 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Studies in economic theory,v.301431-8849 ;. - Studies in economic theory ;28..

Chapter 1 Preface -- Part I Mechanism Design under Bounded Rationality -- Chapter 2 Introduction -- Chapter 3 Complexity constraints and mechanism design -- Chapter 4 Learning, probabilistic choice, and mechanism design -- Chapter 5 Some other models of mechanism design under bounded rationality -- Chapter 6 Conclusions -- Part II Social Norms and Mechanism Design -- Chapter 7 Peer Pressure and Agency Relationship -- Chapter 8 Statistical Mechanics of High Performing Working Systems -- Chapter 9 Optimal contracting in social environment -- Part III Lessons learnt and directions for future research.

This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation. Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design. This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.

ISBN: 9789811010415

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

393129
Contracts
--Economic aspects.

LC Class. No.: HB74.P8 / B37 2016

Dewey Class. No.: 330.019

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