大葉大學圖書館 |

Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	321.8
書名/作者:	Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy // Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson.
其他題名:	Economic Origins of Dictatorship & Democracy
作者:	Acemoglu, Daron,
其他作者:	Robinson, James A.,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xv, 416 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Democracy - Economic aspects.
標題:	Democratization.
標題:	Equality.
標題:	Political culture.
標題:	Dictatorship.
標題:	Comparative government.
ISBN:	9780511510809 (ebook)
摘要、提要註:	This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510809

Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy /
Acemoglu, Daron,

Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy /Economic Origins of Dictatorship & DemocracyDaron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson. - 1 online resource (xv, 416 pages) :digital, PDF file(s).

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization.

ISBN: 9780511510809 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

415542
Democracy
--Economic aspects.

LC Class. No.: JC423 / .A248 2006

Dewey Class. No.: 321.8

Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy /
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