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Designing economic mechanisms /
~
Hurwicz, Leonid,
Designing economic mechanisms /
紀錄類型:
書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:
330.01/5195
書名/作者:
Designing economic mechanisms // Leonid Hurwicz, Stanley Reiter.
作者:
Hurwicz, Leonid,
其他作者:
Reiter, Stanley,
面頁冊數:
1 online resource (ix, 344 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
附註:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:
Economics, Mathematical.
標題:
Economics - Mathematical models.
標題:
Mathematical optimization.
標題:
Game theory.
ISBN:
9780511754258 (ebook)
摘要、提要註:
A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
電子資源:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754258
Designing economic mechanisms /
Hurwicz, Leonid,
Designing economic mechanisms /
Leonid Hurwicz, Stanley Reiter. - 1 online resource (ix, 344 pages) :digital, PDF file(s).
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
ISBN: 9780511754258 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:
227334
Economics, Mathematical.
LC Class. No.: HB135 / .H87 2006
Dewey Class. No.: 330.01/5195
Designing economic mechanisms /
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A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754258
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