大葉大學圖書館 |

The politics of constitutional review in Germany /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	347.43/012
書名/作者:	The politics of constitutional review in Germany // Georg Vanberg.
作者:	Vanberg, Georg,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xii, 193 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Judicial review - Public opinion. - Germany
標題:	Judicial review - Political aspects - Germany.
ISBN:	9780511510427 (ebook)
內容註:	The politics of constitutional review -- Implementation, public support, and transparency -- The Federal Constitutional Court in comparative perspective -- Transparency and judicial deference -- From the inside looking out : judicial and legislative perceptions -- Pushing limits : party finance legislation and the Bunderverfassungsgericht -- Prudent jurists.
摘要、提要註:	Constitutional courts have emerged as central institutions in many advanced democracies. This book investigates the sources and the limits of judicial authority, focusing on the central role of public support for judicial independence. The empirical sections of the book illustrate the theoretical argument in an in-depth study of the German Federal Constitutional Court, including statistical analysis of judicial decisions, case studies, and interviews with judges and legislators. The book's major finding is that the interests of governing majorities, prevailing public opinion, and the transparency of the political environment exert a powerful influence on judicial decisions. Judges are influenced not only by jurisprudential considerations and their policy preferences, but also by strategic concerns. By highlighting this dimension of constitutional review, the book challenges the contention that high court justices are largely unconstrained actors as well as the notion that constitutional courts lack democratic legitimacy.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510427

The politics of constitutional review in Germany /
Vanberg, Georg,1971-

The politics of constitutional review in Germany /Georg Vanberg. - 1 online resource (xii, 193 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). - Political economy of institutions and decisions. - Political economy of institutions and decisions..

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

The politics of constitutional review -- Implementation, public support, and transparency -- The Federal Constitutional Court in comparative perspective -- Transparency and judicial deference -- From the inside looking out : judicial and legislative perceptions -- Pushing limits : party finance legislation and the Bunderverfassungsgericht -- Prudent jurists.

Constitutional courts have emerged as central institutions in many advanced democracies. This book investigates the sources and the limits of judicial authority, focusing on the central role of public support for judicial independence. The empirical sections of the book illustrate the theoretical argument in an in-depth study of the German Federal Constitutional Court, including statistical analysis of judicial decisions, case studies, and interviews with judges and legislators. The book's major finding is that the interests of governing majorities, prevailing public opinion, and the transparency of the political environment exert a powerful influence on judicial decisions. Judges are influenced not only by jurisprudential considerations and their policy preferences, but also by strategic concerns. By highlighting this dimension of constitutional review, the book challenges the contention that high court justices are largely unconstrained actors as well as the notion that constitutional courts lack democratic legitimacy.

ISBN: 9780511510427 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

643558
Judicial review
--Public opinion.--Germany

LC Class. No.: KK5475 / .V36 2005

Dewey Class. No.: 347.43/012

The politics of constitutional review in Germany /
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