大葉大學圖書館 |

Democracy and the rule of law /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	340/.11
書名/作者:	Democracy and the rule of law // edited by José Mariá Maravall, Adam Przeworski.
其他題名:	Democracy & the Rule of Law
其他作者:	Przeworski, Adam,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xi, 321 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Rule of law - Congresses.
標題:	Democracy
ISBN:	9780511610066 (ebook)
內容註:	Lineages of the rule of law / Stephen Holmes -- Power, rules, and compliance / Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca -- Obedience and obligation in the Rechtsstaat / Michel Troper -- A postscript to "Political foundations of democracy and the rule of law" / Barry R. Weingast -- Why do political parties obey results of elections / Adam Przeworski -- The majoritarian reading of the rule of law / Roberto Gargarella / How can the rule of law rule : cost imposition through decentralized mechanisms / Catalina Smulovitz -- Dictatorship and the rule of law : rules and military power in Pinochet's Chile / Robert Barros -- Courts as an instrument of horizontal accountability : the case of latin Europe / Carlo Guarnieri -- Rule of democracy and rule of law / John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino -- The rule of law as a political weapon / José María Maravall -- The rule of law and the problem of legal reform in Michel de Montaigne's Essais / Biancamaria Fontana.
摘要、提要註:	This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. The traditional answer of jurists has been that laws have an autonomous causal efficacy: law rules when actions follow anterior norms; the relation between laws and actions is one of obedience, obligation, or compliance. Contrary to this conception, the authors defend a positive interpretation where the rule of law results from the strategic choices of relevant actors. Rule of law is just one possible outcome in which political actors process their conflicts using whatever resources they can muster: only when these actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to la, does law rule. What distinguishes 'rule-of-law' as an institutional equilibrium from 'rule-by-law' is the distribution of power. The former emerges when no one group is strong enough to dominate the others and when the many use institutions to promote their interest.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610066

Democracy and the rule of law /
Democracy and the rule of law /Democracy & the Rule of Lawedited by José Mariá Maravall, Adam Przeworski. - 1 online resource (xi, 321 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). - Cambridge studies in the theory of democracy ;5. - Cambridge studies in the theory of democracy ;4..

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Lineages of the rule of law / Stephen Holmes -- Power, rules, and compliance / Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca -- Obedience and obligation in the Rechtsstaat / Michel Troper -- A postscript to "Political foundations of democracy and the rule of law" / Barry R. Weingast -- Why do political parties obey results of elections / Adam Przeworski -- The majoritarian reading of the rule of law / Roberto Gargarella / How can the rule of law rule : cost imposition through decentralized mechanisms / Catalina Smulovitz -- Dictatorship and the rule of law : rules and military power in Pinochet's Chile / Robert Barros -- Courts as an instrument of horizontal accountability : the case of latin Europe / Carlo Guarnieri -- Rule of democracy and rule of law / John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino -- The rule of law as a political weapon / José María Maravall -- The rule of law and the problem of legal reform in Michel de Montaigne's Essais / Biancamaria Fontana.

This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. The traditional answer of jurists has been that laws have an autonomous causal efficacy: law rules when actions follow anterior norms; the relation between laws and actions is one of obedience, obligation, or compliance. Contrary to this conception, the authors defend a positive interpretation where the rule of law results from the strategic choices of relevant actors. Rule of law is just one possible outcome in which political actors process their conflicts using whatever resources they can muster: only when these actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to la, does law rule. What distinguishes 'rule-of-law' as an institutional equilibrium from 'rule-by-law' is the distribution of power. The former emerges when no one group is strong enough to dominate the others and when the many use institutions to promote their interest.

ISBN: 9780511610066 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

340989
Rule of law
--Congresses.

LC Class. No.: K3171.A6 / D46 2003

Dewey Class. No.: 340/.11

Democracy and the rule of law /
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