Rationality, representation, and rac...
Heikes, Deborah K.

 

  • Rationality, representation, and race[electronic resource] /
  • 紀錄類型: 書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
    杜威分類號: 128.33089
    書名/作者: Rationality, representation, and race/ by Deborah K. Heikes.
    作者: Heikes, Deborah K.
    出版者: London : : Palgrave Macmillan UK :, 2016.
    面頁冊數: xii, 262 p. : : digital ;; 22 cm.
    Contained By: Springer eBooks
    標題: Reason.
    標題: Mental representation.
    標題: Race.
    標題: Philosophy.
    標題: Moral Philosophy.
    標題: Feminism.
    ISBN: 9781137591715
    ISBN: 9781137591708
    內容註: Preface -- 1 What's the Problem? -- 1.1 The Terrain of Reason -- 1.2 In the Shadow of Modern Reason -- 1.3 Out of the Darkness -- 1.4 Beyond Modernism -- 2 Representation and Racism -- 2.1 Reason's Retrenchment -- 2.2 Purposive Racism -- 2.3 Vision and Representation -- 2.4 The Value of Inequality -- 2.5 Essential Inequalities -- 3 Philosophy's Outward Turn -- 3.1 The Turn Away From Modernism -- 3.2 The Pragmatic Turn: Peirce -- 3.3 The Continental Turn: Heidegger -- 3.4 The Analytic Turn: Wittgenstein -- 3.5 Post-Cartesian Observation -- 4 The Origin of Mind -- 4.1 Homer and the Presocratics -- 4.2 Plato and the Cartesian Problem -- 4.3 Aristotle and the Diversity of Soul -- 4.4 The Virtue of Reason -- 4.5 Virtue and Representation -- 5 The Promise of Virtue -- 5.1 Essentialism and The Darwinian Turn -- 5.2 Reason's Evolution -- 5.3 The Virtue of Moral Grounds -- 5.4 Reasonableness -- 5.5 Beyond Representationalism -- 5.6 The Virtue of Virtue -- References -- Index.
    摘要、提要註: During the Enlightenment, rationality becomes not a property belonging to all humans but something that one must achieve. This transformation has the effect of excluding non-whites and non-males from the domain of reason. Heikes seeks to uncover the source of this exclusion, which she argues stems from the threat of subjectivism inherent in modern thinking. As an alternative, she considers post-Cartesian reactions of modern representationalism as well as ancient Greek understandings of mind as simply one part of a functionally diverse soul. In the end, she maintains that treating rationality as an evolutionarily situated virtue concept allows for an understanding of rationality that recognizes diversity and that grounds substantive moral concepts.
    電子資源: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59171-5
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