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Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity[electronic resource] /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	005.82
書名/作者:	Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity/ by Juliane Kramer.
作者:	Kramer, Juliane.
出版者:	Singapore : : Springer Singapore :, 2015.
面頁冊數:	xxi, 122 p. : : ill., digital ;; 24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Data encryption (Computer science)
標題:	Engineering.
標題:	Communications Engineering, Networks.
標題:	Coding and Information Theory.
標題:	Security Science and Technology.
標題:	Mathematical Applications in Computer Science.
ISBN:	9789812877871
ISBN:	9789812877864
內容註:	Introduction -- Mathematical and Cryptological Background -- Photonic Emission Analysis -- The Photonic Side Channel -- Higher-Order Fault Attacks against Pairing Computations -- Future Work and Conclusion.
摘要、提要註:	This book presents two practical physical attacks. It shows how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these attacks, and presents countermeasures on the software and the hardware level that can help to prevent them in the future. Though their theory has been known for several years now, since neither attack has yet been successfully implemented in practice, they have generally not been considered a serious threat. In short, their physical attack complexity has been overestimated and the implied security threat has been underestimated. First, the book introduces the photonic side channel, which offers not only temporal resolution, but also the highest possible spatial resolution. Due to the high cost of its initial implementation, it has not been taken seriously. The work shows both simple and differential photonic side channel analyses. Then, it presents a fault attack against pairing-based cryptography. Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has not been taken seriously either. Based on these two attacks, the book demonstrates that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone, and as such cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all physical attacks, whether they have already been successfully implemented or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is sufficiently understood.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-787-1

Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity[electronic resource] /
Kramer, Juliane.

Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity[electronic resource] /by Juliane Kramer. - Singapore :Springer Singapore :2015. - xxi, 122 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - T-Labs series in telecommunication services,2192-2810. - T-Labs series in telecommunication services..

Introduction -- Mathematical and Cryptological Background -- Photonic Emission Analysis -- The Photonic Side Channel -- Higher-Order Fault Attacks against Pairing Computations -- Future Work and Conclusion.

This book presents two practical physical attacks. It shows how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these attacks, and presents countermeasures on the software and the hardware level that can help to prevent them in the future. Though their theory has been known for several years now, since neither attack has yet been successfully implemented in practice, they have generally not been considered a serious threat. In short, their physical attack complexity has been overestimated and the implied security threat has been underestimated. First, the book introduces the photonic side channel, which offers not only temporal resolution, but also the highest possible spatial resolution. Due to the high cost of its initial implementation, it has not been taken seriously. The work shows both simple and differential photonic side channel analyses. Then, it presents a fault attack against pairing-based cryptography. Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has not been taken seriously either. Based on these two attacks, the book demonstrates that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone, and as such cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all physical attacks, whether they have already been successfully implemented or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is sufficiently understood.

ISBN: 9789812877871

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-981-287-787-1doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

369827
Data encryption (Computer science)

LC Class. No.: QA76.9.A25

Dewey Class. No.: 005.82

Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity[electronic resource] /
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