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The craft of bureaucratic neutrality :interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	363.1/10684
書名/作者:	The craft of bureaucratic neutrality : : interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety // Gregory A. Huber.
作者:	Huber, Gregory Alain,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (viii, 256 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Industrial safety - Law and legislation - United States.
標題:	Industrial hygiene - Law and legislation - United States.
標題:	Industrial safety - Government policy - United States.
標題:	Industrial hygiene - Government policy - United States.
標題:	Bureaucracy.
ISBN:	9780511509841 (ebook)
內容註:	Bureaucratic power and strategic neutrality -- Political conflict and the occupational safety and health act -- From regulatory search to enforcement -- Unpacking OSHA's field enforcement effort -- Reconciling these findings with previous research -- Strategic neutrality and the control of field enforcement -- Federal oversight and state OSH Act enforcement -- Conclusion.
摘要、提要註:	Are political understandings of bureaucracy incompatible with Weberian features of administrative neutrality? In examining the question of whether interest groups and elected officials are able to influence how government agencies implement the law, this book identifies the political origins of bureaucratic neutrality. In bridging the traditional gap between questions of internal management (public administration) and external politics (political science), Huber argues that 'strategic neutrality' allows bureaucratic leaders to both manage their subordinates and sustain political support. By analyzing the OSH Act of 1970, Huber demonstrates the political origins and benefits of administrative neutrality, and contrasts it with apolitical and unconstrained administrative implementation. Historical analysis, interviews with field-level bureaucrats and their supervisors, and quantitative analysis provide a rich understanding of the twin difficulties agency leaders face as political actors and personnel managers.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511509841

The craft of bureaucratic neutrality :interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety /
Huber, Gregory Alain,1973-

The craft of bureaucratic neutrality :interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety /Gregory A. Huber. - 1 online resource (viii, 256 pages) :digital, PDF file(s).

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Bureaucratic power and strategic neutrality -- Political conflict and the occupational safety and health act -- From regulatory search to enforcement -- Unpacking OSHA's field enforcement effort -- Reconciling these findings with previous research -- Strategic neutrality and the control of field enforcement -- Federal oversight and state OSH Act enforcement -- Conclusion.

Are political understandings of bureaucracy incompatible with Weberian features of administrative neutrality? In examining the question of whether interest groups and elected officials are able to influence how government agencies implement the law, this book identifies the political origins of bureaucratic neutrality. In bridging the traditional gap between questions of internal management (public administration) and external politics (political science), Huber argues that 'strategic neutrality' allows bureaucratic leaders to both manage their subordinates and sustain political support. By analyzing the OSH Act of 1970, Huber demonstrates the political origins and benefits of administrative neutrality, and contrasts it with apolitical and unconstrained administrative implementation. Historical analysis, interviews with field-level bureaucrats and their supervisors, and quantitative analysis provide a rich understanding of the twin difficulties agency leaders face as political actors and personnel managers.

ISBN: 9780511509841 (ebook)Subjects--Corporate Names:

339569
United States.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.Subjects--Topical Terms:

433445
Industrial safety
--Law and legislation--United States.

LC Class. No.: KF3570 / .H83 2007

Dewey Class. No.: 363.1/10684

The craft of bureaucratic neutrality :interests and influence in governmental regulation of occupational safety /
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