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Financial crisis, corporate governance and bank capital[electronic resource] /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	331.28133210973
書名/作者:	Financial crisis, corporate governance and bank capital/ Sanjai Bhagat.
作者:	Bhagat, Sanjai.
出版者:	Cambridge : : Cambridge University Press,, 2017.
面頁冊數:	xv, 242 p. : : digital ;; 24 cm.
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 20 Mar 2017).
標題:	Banks and banking - United States.
標題:	Bankers - Salaries, etc. - United States.
標題:	Bank capital - United States.
標題:	Corporate governance - United States.
標題:	Finance - Government policy - United States.
標題:	Financial crises - United States.
ISBN:	9781316756669
ISBN:	9781107170643
摘要、提要註:	In the aftermath of the 2007-8 crisis, senior policymakers and the media have blamed excessive risk-taking undertaken by bank executives, in response to their compensation incentives, for the crisis. The inevitable follow-up to this was to introduce stronger financial regulation, in the hope that better and more ethical behaviour can be induced. Despite the honourable intentions of regulation, such as the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, it is clear that many big banks are still deemed too big to fail. This book argues that by restructuring executive incentive programmes to include only restricted stock and restricted stock options with very long vesting periods, and financing banks with considerably more equity, the potential of future financial crises can be minimized. It will be of great value to corporate executives, corporate board members, institutional investors and economic policymakers, as well as graduate and undergraduate students studying finance, economics and law.
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316756669

Financial crisis, corporate governance and bank capital[electronic resource] /
Bhagat, Sanjai.

Financial crisis, corporate governance and bank capital[electronic resource] /Sanjai Bhagat. - Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,2017. - xv, 242 p. :digital ;24 cm.

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 20 Mar 2017).

In the aftermath of the 2007-8 crisis, senior policymakers and the media have blamed excessive risk-taking undertaken by bank executives, in response to their compensation incentives, for the crisis. The inevitable follow-up to this was to introduce stronger financial regulation, in the hope that better and more ethical behaviour can be induced. Despite the honourable intentions of regulation, such as the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, it is clear that many big banks are still deemed too big to fail. This book argues that by restructuring executive incentive programmes to include only restricted stock and restricted stock options with very long vesting periods, and financing banks with considerably more equity, the potential of future financial crises can be minimized. It will be of great value to corporate executives, corporate board members, institutional investors and economic policymakers, as well as graduate and undergraduate students studying finance, economics and law.

ISBN: 9781316756669Subjects--Topical Terms:

578426
Banks and banking
--United States.

LC Class. No.: HG2491 / .B48 2017

Dewey Class. No.: 331.28133210973

Financial crisis, corporate governance and bank capital[electronic resource] /
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