大葉大學圖書館 |

Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation[electronic resource] /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	338.5
書名/作者:	Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation/ by T.V.S. Ramamohan Rao.
作者:	Rao, T.V.S. Ramamohan.
出版者:	New Delhi : : Springer India :, 2016.
面頁冊數:	xvii, 293 p. : : ill., digital ;; 24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Risk - Mathematical models.
標題:	Risk management.
標題:	Macroeconomics.
標題:	Economics.
標題:	Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics.
標題:	Microeconomics.
標題:	R & D/Technology Policy.
標題:	Finance, general.
標題:	Industrial Organization.
ISBN:	9788132225621
ISBN:	9788132225614
內容註:	1. Introduction -- 2. Conferences and Publications -- 3. Knowledge Intensity and Risk sharing -- 4. Information Asymmetry -- 5. Technology Transfer -- 6. Equity Participation -- 7. Cost Sharing -- 8. Warranties and Risk Sharing -- 9. Accident and Health Insurance -- 10. Securitization and Volatility -- 11. Foreign Institutional Investors and Regulatory Diligence -- 12. Financial Crisis and Regulatory Policy -- 13. Estimating the Parameters -- 14. Conclusion.
摘要、提要註:	The book provides an integrated approach to risk sharing, risk spreading and efficient regulation through principal agent models. It emphasizes the role of information asymmetry and risk sharing in contracts as an alternative to transaction cost considerations. It examines how contracting, as an institutional mechanism to conduct transactions, spreads risks while attempting consolidation. It further highlights the shifting emphasis in contracts from Coasian transaction cost saving to risk sharing and shows how it creates difficulties associated with risk spreading, and emphasizes the need for efficient regulation of contracts at various levels. Each of the chapters is structured using a principal agent model, and all chapters incorporate adverse selection (and exogenous randomness) as a result of information asymmetry, as well as moral hazard (and endogenous randomness) due to the self-interest-seeking behavior on the part of the participants.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2562-1

Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation[electronic resource] /
Rao, T.V.S. Ramamohan.

Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation[electronic resource] /by T.V.S. Ramamohan Rao. - New Delhi :Springer India :2016. - xvii, 293 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

1. Introduction -- 2. Conferences and Publications -- 3. Knowledge Intensity and Risk sharing -- 4. Information Asymmetry -- 5. Technology Transfer -- 6. Equity Participation -- 7. Cost Sharing -- 8. Warranties and Risk Sharing -- 9. Accident and Health Insurance -- 10. Securitization and Volatility -- 11. Foreign Institutional Investors and Regulatory Diligence -- 12. Financial Crisis and Regulatory Policy -- 13. Estimating the Parameters -- 14. Conclusion.

The book provides an integrated approach to risk sharing, risk spreading and efficient regulation through principal agent models. It emphasizes the role of information asymmetry and risk sharing in contracts as an alternative to transaction cost considerations. It examines how contracting, as an institutional mechanism to conduct transactions, spreads risks while attempting consolidation. It further highlights the shifting emphasis in contracts from Coasian transaction cost saving to risk sharing and shows how it creates difficulties associated with risk spreading, and emphasizes the need for efficient regulation of contracts at various levels. Each of the chapters is structured using a principal agent model, and all chapters incorporate adverse selection (and exogenous randomness) as a result of information asymmetry, as well as moral hazard (and endogenous randomness) due to the self-interest-seeking behavior on the part of the participants.

ISBN: 9788132225621

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-81-322-2562-1doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

483274
Risk
--Mathematical models.

LC Class. No.: HB615

Dewey Class. No.: 338.5

Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation[electronic resource] /
LDR:02420nam a2200337 a 4500 001 455618
003 DE-He213
005 20160812093802.0
006 m d
007 cr nn 008maaau
008 161227s2016 ii s 0 eng d
020 $a 9788132225621 $q (electronic bk.)
020 $a 9788132225614 $q (paper)
024 7 $a 10.1007/978-81-322-2562-1 $2 doi
035 $a 978-81-322-2562-1
040 $a GP $c GP
041 0 $a eng
050 4 $a HB615
072 7 $a KCB $2 bicssc
072 7 $a KCBM $2 bicssc
072 7 $a BUS039000 $2 bisacsh
072 7 $a BUS045000 $2 bisacsh
082 0 4 $a 338.5 $2 23
090 $a HB615 $b .R215 2016
100 1 $a Rao, T.V.S. Ramamohan. $3 654179
245 1 0 $a Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation $h [electronic resource] / $c by T.V.S. Ramamohan Rao.
260 $a New Delhi : $b Springer India : $b Imprint: Springer, $c 2016.
300 $a xvii, 293 p. : $b ill., digital ; $c 24 cm.
505 0 $a 1. Introduction -- 2. Conferences and Publications -- 3. Knowledge Intensity and Risk sharing -- 4. Information Asymmetry -- 5. Technology Transfer -- 6. Equity Participation -- 7. Cost Sharing -- 8. Warranties and Risk Sharing -- 9. Accident and Health Insurance -- 10. Securitization and Volatility -- 11. Foreign Institutional Investors and Regulatory Diligence -- 12. Financial Crisis and Regulatory Policy -- 13. Estimating the Parameters -- 14. Conclusion.
520 $a The book provides an integrated approach to risk sharing, risk spreading and efficient regulation through principal agent models. It emphasizes the role of information asymmetry and risk sharing in contracts as an alternative to transaction cost considerations. It examines how contracting, as an institutional mechanism to conduct transactions, spreads risks while attempting consolidation. It further highlights the shifting emphasis in contracts from Coasian transaction cost saving to risk sharing and shows how it creates difficulties associated with risk spreading, and emphasizes the need for efficient regulation of contracts at various levels. Each of the chapters is structured using a principal agent model, and all chapters incorporate adverse selection (and exogenous randomness) as a result of information asymmetry, as well as moral hazard (and endogenous randomness) due to the self-interest-seeking behavior on the part of the participants.
650 0 $a Risk $x Mathematical models. $3 483274
650 0 $a Risk management. $3 226935
650 0 $a Macroeconomics. $3 189583
650 1 4 $a Economics. $3 172164
650 2 4 $a Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics. $3 634732
650 2 4 $a Microeconomics. $3 172127
650 2 4 $a R & D/Technology Policy. $3 464214
650 2 4 $a Finance, general. $3 634722
650 2 4 $a Industrial Organization. $3 463469
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 463450
773 0 $t Springer eBooks
856 4 0 $u http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2562-1
950 $a Economics and Finance (Springer-41170)