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Governing the firm :workers' control...

Dow, Gregory K., (1954-)

Governing the firm :workers' control in theory and practice /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	338.6
書名/作者:	Governing the firm : : workers' control in theory and practice // Gregory K. Dow.
作者:	Dow, Gregory K.,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xv, 323 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Industrial management - Employee participation.
標題:	Employee ownership.
標題:	Corporate governance.
標題:	Industrial organization (Economic theory)
ISBN:	9780511615849 (ebook)
摘要、提要註:	Most large firms are controlled by shareholders, who choose the board of directors and can replace the firm's management. In rare instances, however, control over the firm rests with the workforce. Many explanations for the rarity of workers' control have been offered, but there have been few attempts to assess these hypotheses in a systematic way. This book draws upon economic theory, statistical evidence, and case studies to frame an explanation. The fundamental idea is that labor is inalienable, while capital can be freely transferred from one person to another. This implies that worker-controlled firms typically face financing problems, encounter collective choice dilemmas, and have difficulty creating markets for control positions within the firm. Together these factors can account for much of what is known about the incidence, behavior, and design of worker-controlled firms. A policy proposal to encourage employee buyouts is developed in the concluding chapter.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615849

Governing the firm :workers' control in theory and practice /
Dow, Gregory K.,1954-

Governing the firm :workers' control in theory and practice /Gregory K. Dow. - 1 online resource (xv, 323 pages) :digital, PDF file(s).

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Most large firms are controlled by shareholders, who choose the board of directors and can replace the firm's management. In rare instances, however, control over the firm rests with the workforce. Many explanations for the rarity of workers' control have been offered, but there have been few attempts to assess these hypotheses in a systematic way. This book draws upon economic theory, statistical evidence, and case studies to frame an explanation. The fundamental idea is that labor is inalienable, while capital can be freely transferred from one person to another. This implies that worker-controlled firms typically face financing problems, encounter collective choice dilemmas, and have difficulty creating markets for control positions within the firm. Together these factors can account for much of what is known about the incidence, behavior, and design of worker-controlled firms. A policy proposal to encourage employee buyouts is developed in the concluding chapter.

ISBN: 9780511615849 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

376843
Industrial management
--Employee participation.

LC Class. No.: HD5650 / .D64 2003

Dewey Class. No.: 338.6

Governing the firm :workers' control in theory and practice /
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520 $a Most large firms are controlled by shareholders, who choose the board of directors and can replace the firm's management. In rare instances, however, control over the firm rests with the workforce. Many explanations for the rarity of workers' control have been offered, but there have been few attempts to assess these hypotheses in a systematic way. This book draws upon economic theory, statistical evidence, and case studies to frame an explanation. The fundamental idea is that labor is inalienable, while capital can be freely transferred from one person to another. This implies that worker-controlled firms typically face financing problems, encounter collective choice dilemmas, and have difficulty creating markets for control positions within the firm. Together these factors can account for much of what is known about the incidence, behavior, and design of worker-controlled firms. A policy proposal to encourage employee buyouts is developed in the concluding chapter.
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650 0 $a Employee ownership. $3 580370
650 0 $a Corporate governance. $3 340765
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