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Timber booms and institutional breakdown in southeast Asia /

纪录类型:	书目-语言数据,印刷品 : Monograph/item
[NT 15000414] null:	333.75/137/0959
[NT 47271] Title/Author:	Timber booms and institutional breakdown in southeast Asia // Michael L. Ross.
[NT 51403] remainder title:	Timber Booms & Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia
作者:	Ross, Michael Lewin,
面页册数:	1 online resource (xvi, 237 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
附注:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
标题:	Forest management - Environmental aspects - Southeast Asia.
标题:	Forest policy - Environmental aspects - Southeast Asia.
标题:	Logging - Economic aspects - Southeast Asia.
标题:	Timber - Economic aspects - Southeast Asia.
标题:	Rent (Economic theory)
ISBN:	9780511510359 (ebook)
[NT 15000228] null:	1. Introduction: Three Puzzles -- 2. The Problem of Resource Booms -- 3. Explaining Institutional Breakdown -- 4. The Philippines: The Legal Slaughter of the Forests -- 5. Sabah, Malaysia: A New State of Affairs -- 6. Sarawak, Malaysia: An Almost Uncontrollable Instinct -- 7. Indonesia: Putting the Forests to "Better Use" -- 8. Conclusion: Rent Seeking and Rent Seizing.
[NT 15000229] null:	Scholars have long studied how institutions emerge and become stable. But why do institutions sometimes break down? In this book, Michael L. Ross explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. He shows that these institutions often break down when states receive positive trade shocks - unanticipated windfalls. Drawing on the theory of rent-seeking, he suggests that these institutions succumb to a problem he calls 'rent-seizing' - the predatory behavior of politicians who seek to supply rent to others, and who purposefully dismantle institutions that restrain them. Using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, he shows how windfalls tend to trigger rent-seizing activities that may have disastrous consequences for state institutions, and for the government of natural resources. More generally, he shows how institutions can collapse when they have become endogenous to any rent-seeking process.
电子资源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510359

Timber booms and institutional breakdown in southeast Asia /
Ross, Michael Lewin,1961-

Timber booms and institutional breakdown in southeast Asia /Timber Booms & Institutional Breakdown in Southeast AsiaMichael L. Ross. - 1 online resource (xvi, 237 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). - Political economy of institutions and decisions. - Political economy of institutions and decisions..

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

1. Introduction: Three Puzzles -- 2. The Problem of Resource Booms -- 3. Explaining Institutional Breakdown -- 4. The Philippines: The Legal Slaughter of the Forests -- 5. Sabah, Malaysia: A New State of Affairs -- 6. Sarawak, Malaysia: An Almost Uncontrollable Instinct -- 7. Indonesia: Putting the Forests to "Better Use" -- 8. Conclusion: Rent Seeking and Rent Seizing.

Scholars have long studied how institutions emerge and become stable. But why do institutions sometimes break down? In this book, Michael L. Ross explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. He shows that these institutions often break down when states receive positive trade shocks - unanticipated windfalls. Drawing on the theory of rent-seeking, he suggests that these institutions succumb to a problem he calls 'rent-seizing' - the predatory behavior of politicians who seek to supply rent to others, and who purposefully dismantle institutions that restrain them. Using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, he shows how windfalls tend to trigger rent-seizing activities that may have disastrous consequences for state institutions, and for the government of natural resources. More generally, he shows how institutions can collapse when they have become endogenous to any rent-seeking process.

ISBN: 9780511510359 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

643550
Forest management
--Environmental aspects--Southeast Asia.

LC Class. No.: SD387.E58 / R67 2001

Dewey Class. No.: 333.75/137/0959

Timber booms and institutional breakdown in southeast Asia /
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505 0 $a 1. Introduction: Three Puzzles -- 2. The Problem of Resource Booms -- 3. Explaining Institutional Breakdown -- 4. The Philippines: The Legal Slaughter of the Forests -- 5. Sabah, Malaysia: A New State of Affairs -- 6. Sarawak, Malaysia: An Almost Uncontrollable Instinct -- 7. Indonesia: Putting the Forests to "Better Use" -- 8. Conclusion: Rent Seeking and Rent Seizing.
520 $a Scholars have long studied how institutions emerge and become stable. But why do institutions sometimes break down? In this book, Michael L. Ross explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. He shows that these institutions often break down when states receive positive trade shocks - unanticipated windfalls. Drawing on the theory of rent-seeking, he suggests that these institutions succumb to a problem he calls 'rent-seizing' - the predatory behavior of politicians who seek to supply rent to others, and who purposefully dismantle institutions that restrain them. Using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, he shows how windfalls tend to trigger rent-seizing activities that may have disastrous consequences for state institutions, and for the government of natural resources. More generally, he shows how institutions can collapse when they have become endogenous to any rent-seeking process.
650 0 $a Forest management $x Environmental aspects $z Southeast Asia. $3 643550
650 0 $a Forest policy $x Environmental aspects $z Southeast Asia. $3 643551
650 0 $a Logging $x Economic aspects $z Southeast Asia. $3 643552
650 0 $a Timber $x Economic aspects $z Southeast Asia. $3 643553
650 0 $a Rent (Economic theory) $3 643554
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830 0 $a Political economy of institutions and decisions. $3 642351
856 4 0 $u http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510359