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Policy instruments for sound fiscal policies[electronic resource] :fiscal rules and institutions /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	339.5/2
書名/作者:	Policy instruments for sound fiscal policies : fiscal rules and institutions // edited by Joaquim Ayuso-i-Casals, Servaas Deroose, Elena Flores, Laurent Moulin.
其他作者:	Ayuso-i-Casals, Joaquim,
出版者:	Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, N.Y. : : Palgrave Macmillan,, 2009.
面頁冊數:	xvi, 356 p. : : ill. ;; 22 cm.
標題:	Fiscal policy.
標題:	Policy sciences.
ISBN:	9780230271791
ISBN:	0230271790
書目註:	Includes bibliographical references and index.
內容註:	Part I: Fiscal rules and institutions as useful devices to address the deficit bias. -- Dealing with the deficit bias :rpinciples and policies / Singe Krogstrup and Wharles Wyplosz -- The discipline-enhancing role of fiscal institutions: theory and empirical evidence / Xavier Debrun and Mambmohan S. Kumar -- The surplus factor / Teunis Broesens and Peter Wierts -- Comments on Part I / Carlos Martâinez Mongay -- Part II:Forms of Governance, rules and institutions. -- The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries / Mark Hallerberg, Rolf Strauch and Jèurgenvon Hagen -- National fiscal institutionsand the stability and growth pact: are 'delegation states'at a disadvantage? / Dermot Hodson -- Comments on Part II / Charles Wyplosz --PartIII: Specific institutional arrangements to improve fiscal polity -- Rainy day funds: can they make a difference in Europe? / Fabrizio Balassone, Daniele Franco & and Stefania Zotteri -- Beyond the SGP: features and effects of EU national-level fiscal rules /Joaquim Ayuso-i-Casals ... [et al.] -- Who provides signals to voters about government competence on fiscal matters? The importance of independent watchdogs /EloèiseStâeclebout-Orseau and Mark Hallerberg -- Optimal debt policy and an institutional proposal to help in its implementation / Tatiana Kirsanova, Campbell Leith and Simon Wren-Lewis -- Comments on Part III / TeresaTer-Minassian -- Part IV: Country specific experiences -- The Swedish budget 'model': a genuine beauty or in need of a face lift? / Robert Boije and Jonas Fischer -- Fiscal councils, independent forecasts and the budgetary process: lessons from the Belgian case / Igor Lebrun -- Comments on Part IV / Lars Jonung.
摘要、提要註:	Economic literature has extensively analysed how taxes, government spending and budget balances should be set over the cycle in order to ensure the conduct of an appropriate fiscal policy. However, experience has shown that governments do not always pursue sound and sustainable policies. Rather, they have a tendency to implement pro-cyclical policies, in both good and bad times, while debt ratios have increased in many countries over the past few decades due to protracted budgetary deficits. The causes of this deficit bias and the tendency to conduct pro-cyclical budgetary policies are related to the common pool problem, policy makers' short-term approach, and voters' fiscal illusion.These elements can lead to an inappropriate use of discretionary decision making andtime-inconsistent fiscal policies, which is particularly worrisome in the context of EMU due to their potentially adverse spillover effects. Policy makers and academics generally agree that the institutional settingof a country critically determines the quality of economic policy making. In particular, the elements that form domestic fiscal frameworks, namely fiscal rules and institutions and budgetary procedures, are key factors influencing the conduct of budgetary policy and limiting the emergence of a deficit bias and the implementation of pro-cyclical fiscal policies. This book focuses on two of these elements: numerical budgetary rules and independent fiscal institutions. The role of these institutional arrangements in shaping budgetary outcomes as well as some specific country experiences are analyzed and assessed throughout this volume, leading to conclusions on the instrumental character of these devices in promoting sound and sustainable fiscal policy.
電子資源:	access to fulltext (Palgrave)

Policy instruments for sound fiscal policies[electronic resource] :fiscal rules and institutions /
Policy instruments for sound fiscal policiesfiscal rules and institutions /[electronic resource] :edited by Joaquim Ayuso-i-Casals, Servaas Deroose, Elena Flores, Laurent Moulin. - Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, N.Y. :Palgrave Macmillan,2009. - xvi, 356 p. :ill. ;22 cm. - Finance and capital markets.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Part I: Fiscal rules and institutions as useful devices to address the deficit bias. -- Dealing with the deficit bias :rpinciples and policies / Singe Krogstrup and Wharles Wyplosz -- The discipline-enhancing role of fiscal institutions: theory and empirical evidence / Xavier Debrun and Mambmohan S. Kumar -- The surplus factor / Teunis Broesens and Peter Wierts -- Comments on Part I / Carlos Martâinez Mongay -- Part II:Forms of Governance, rules and institutions. -- The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries / Mark Hallerberg, Rolf Strauch and Jèurgenvon Hagen -- National fiscal institutionsand the stability and growth pact: are 'delegation states'at a disadvantage? / Dermot Hodson -- Comments on Part II / Charles Wyplosz --PartIII: Specific institutional arrangements to improve fiscal polity -- Rainy day funds: can they make a difference in Europe? / Fabrizio Balassone, Daniele Franco & and Stefania Zotteri -- Beyond the SGP: features and effects of EU national-level fiscal rules /Joaquim Ayuso-i-Casals ... [et al.] -- Who provides signals to voters about government competence on fiscal matters? The importance of independent watchdogs /EloèiseStâeclebout-Orseau and Mark Hallerberg -- Optimal debt policy and an institutional proposal to help in its implementation / Tatiana Kirsanova, Campbell Leith and Simon Wren-Lewis -- Comments on Part III / TeresaTer-Minassian -- Part IV: Country specific experiences -- The Swedish budget 'model': a genuine beauty or in need of a face lift? / Robert Boije and Jonas Fischer -- Fiscal councils, independent forecasts and the budgetary process: lessons from the Belgian case / Igor Lebrun -- Comments on Part IV / Lars Jonung.

Economic literature has extensively analysed how taxes, government spending and budget balances should be set over the cycle in order to ensure the conduct of an appropriate fiscal policy. However, experience has shown that governments do not always pursue sound and sustainable policies. Rather, they have a tendency to implement pro-cyclical policies, in both good and bad times, while debt ratios have increased in many countries over the past few decades due to protracted budgetary deficits. The causes of this deficit bias and the tendency to conduct pro-cyclical budgetary policies are related to the common pool problem, policy makers' short-term approach, and voters' fiscal illusion.These elements can lead to an inappropriate use of discretionary decision making andtime-inconsistent fiscal policies, which is particularly worrisome in the context of EMU due to their potentially adverse spillover effects. Policy makers and academics generally agree that the institutional settingof a country critically determines the quality of economic policy making. In particular, the elements that form domestic fiscal frameworks, namely fiscal rules and institutions and budgetary procedures, are key factors influencing the conduct of budgetary policy and limiting the emergence of a deficit bias and the implementation of pro-cyclical fiscal policies. This book focuses on two of these elements: numerical budgetary rules and independent fiscal institutions. The role of these institutional arrangements in shaping budgetary outcomes as well as some specific country experiences are analyzed and assessed throughout this volume, leading to conclusions on the instrumental character of these devices in promoting sound and sustainable fiscal policy.

Electronic reproduction.
Basingstoke, England :
Palgrave Macmillan,
2010.

Mode of access:World Wide Web.

ISBN: 9780230271791

Standard No.: 10.1057/9780230271791doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

342156
Fiscal policy.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

336502
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: HJ192.5 / .P63 2009

Dewey Class. No.: 339.5/2

Policy instruments for sound fiscal policies[electronic resource] :fiscal rules and institutions /
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