大葉大學圖書館 |

登入

回首頁 到查詢結果 [ subject:"Epistemics." ]

Epistemic paternalism :a defence /

Ahlstr�om, Kristoffer, (1980-,)

Epistemic paternalism :a defence /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	121
書名/作者:	Epistemic paternalism : : a defence // Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij.
作者:	Ahlstr�om, Kristoffer,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xi, 194 pages)
標題:	Epistemics.
ISBN:	9781137313171 (electronic bk.)
ISBN:	113731317X (electronic bk.)
書目註:	Includes bibliographical references and index.
內容註:	1. Why We Cannot Rely On Ourselves For Epistemic Improvement -- 2. Epistemic Paternalism Defined -- 3. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Personal Autonomy -- 4. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Epistemic Autonomy -- 5. Justifying Epistemic Paternalism -- 6. Epistemic Paternalism Defended.
摘要、提要註:	We know that we are fallible creatures, liable to cognitive bias. But we also have a strong and stubborn tendency to overestimate our reasoning capacities. This presents a problem for any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways: While we might see the point of others heeding intellectual advice and relying on reasoning aids, each and every one of us will tend not to see the point of doing so ourselves. The present book argues that the solution to this problem lies in accepting a form of epistemic paternalism. Accepting such paternalism is to accept that we are sometimes justified in interfering with the inquiry of another without her consent but for her own epistemic good. Because when it comes to our freedom to conduct inquiry in whatever way we see fit, more is not always better. In fact, less is often more.
電子資源:	http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doifinder/10.1057/9781137313171

Epistemic paternalism :a defence /
Ahlstr�om, Kristoffer,1980-,

Epistemic paternalism :a defence /Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij. - 1 online resource (xi, 194 pages)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Why We Cannot Rely On Ourselves For Epistemic Improvement -- 2. Epistemic Paternalism Defined -- 3. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Personal Autonomy -- 4. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Epistemic Autonomy -- 5. Justifying Epistemic Paternalism -- 6. Epistemic Paternalism Defended.

We know that we are fallible creatures, liable to cognitive bias. But we also have a strong and stubborn tendency to overestimate our reasoning capacities. This presents a problem for any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways: While we might see the point of others heeding intellectual advice and relying on reasoning aids, each and every one of us will tend not to see the point of doing so ourselves. The present book argues that the solution to this problem lies in accepting a form of epistemic paternalism. Accepting such paternalism is to accept that we are sometimes justified in interfering with the inquiry of another without her consent but for her own epistemic good. Because when it comes to our freedom to conduct inquiry in whatever way we see fit, more is not always better. In fact, less is often more.

ISBN: 9781137313171 (electronic bk.)

Source: 530781Palgrave Macmillanhttp://www.palgraveconnect.comSubjects--Topical Terms:

464053
Epistemics.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

336502
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: B820.3 / .A55 2013

Dewey Class. No.: 121

Epistemic paternalism :a defence /
LDR:02514cam 2200349Ki 4500 001 396521
003 OCoLC
005 20131021112159.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu---unuuu
008 131202s2013 enk ob 001 0 eng d
020 $a 9781137313171 (electronic bk.)
020 $a 113731317X (electronic bk.)
035 $a (OCoLC)858980990
035 $a ocn858980990
037 $a 530781 $b Palgrave Macmillan $n http://www.palgraveconnect.com
040 $a UKPGM $b eng $e rda $e pn $c UKPGM $d OCLCO
049 $a TEFA
050 4 $a B820.3 $b .A55 2013
082 0 4 $a 121 $2 23
100 1 $a Ahlstr�om, Kristoffer, $d 1980-, $e author. $3 551534
245 1 0 $a Epistemic paternalism : $b a defence / $c Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij.
264 1 $a Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; $a New York : $b Palgrave Macmillan, $c 2013.
300 $a 1 online resource (xi, 194 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
504 $a Includes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 $a 1. Why We Cannot Rely On Ourselves For Epistemic Improvement -- 2. Epistemic Paternalism Defined -- 3. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Personal Autonomy -- 4. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Epistemic Autonomy -- 5. Justifying Epistemic Paternalism -- 6. Epistemic Paternalism Defended.
520 $a We know that we are fallible creatures, liable to cognitive bias. But we also have a strong and stubborn tendency to overestimate our reasoning capacities. This presents a problem for any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways: While we might see the point of others heeding intellectual advice and relying on reasoning aids, each and every one of us will tend not to see the point of doing so ourselves. The present book argues that the solution to this problem lies in accepting a form of epistemic paternalism. Accepting such paternalism is to accept that we are sometimes justified in interfering with the inquiry of another without her consent but for her own epistemic good. Because when it comes to our freedom to conduct inquiry in whatever way we see fit, more is not always better. In fact, less is often more.
588 $a Description based on print version record.
650 0 $a Epistemics. $3 464053
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 336502
710 2 $a Palgrave Connect (Online service) $3 370384
776 0 8 $i Print version: $a Ahlstr�om, Kristoffer, 1980- $t Epistemic paternalism. $d Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2013 $z 9780230347892 $w (DLC) 2013021748 $w (OCoLC)834978370
856 4 0 $3 Palgrave Connect $u http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doifinder/10.1057/9781137313171
994 $a C0 $b TEF

筆 0 讀者評論

多媒體

多媒體檔案
http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doifinder/10.1057/9781137313171

評論

新增評論分享你的心得

Export

取書館別