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The economics of contracts :theories and applications /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
杜威分類號:	338
書名/作者:	The economics of contracts : : theories and applications // edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant.
其他作者:	Brousseau, Eric,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xvi, 584 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Contracts - Economic aspects.
ISBN:	9780511613807 (ebook)
摘要、提要註:	A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: 'incentive theory', 'incomplete-contract theory' and 'transaction-costs theory'. These frameworks have enabled scholars to renew both the microeconomics of coordination (with implications for industrial organization, labor economics, law and economics, organization design) and the macroeconomics of 'market' (decentralized) economies and of the institutional framework. These developments have resulted in new analyses of a firm's strategy and State intervention (regulation of public utilities, anti-trust, public procurement, institutional design, liberalization policies, etc.). Based on contributions by the leading scholars in the field, this 2002 book provides an overview of developments in these analytical currents, presents their various aspects, and proposes expanding horizons for theoreticians and practitioners.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613807

The economics of contracts :theories and applications /
The economics of contracts :theories and applications /edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant. - 1 online resource (xvi, 584 pages) :digital, PDF file(s).

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics /Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant --

A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: 'incentive theory', 'incomplete-contract theory' and 'transaction-costs theory'. These frameworks have enabled scholars to renew both the microeconomics of coordination (with implications for industrial organization, labor economics, law and economics, organization design) and the macroeconomics of 'market' (decentralized) economies and of the institutional framework. These developments have resulted in new analyses of a firm's strategy and State intervention (regulation of public utilities, anti-trust, public procurement, institutional design, liberalization policies, etc.). Based on contributions by the leading scholars in the field, this 2002 book provides an overview of developments in these analytical currents, presents their various aspects, and proposes expanding horizons for theoreticians and practitioners.

ISBN: 9780511613807 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

393129
Contracts
--Economic aspects.

LC Class. No.: K840 / .E28 2002

Dewey Class. No.: 338

The economics of contracts :theories and applications /
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505 0 0 $t The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics / $r Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant -- $t Appendix : Canonical models of theories of contract / $r M'Hand Fares -- $t The new institutional economics / $r Ronald Coase -- $t Contract and economic organization / $r Oliver E. Williamson -- $t The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing relationships / $r Benjamin Klein -- $t Entrepreneurship, transaction-cost economics, and the design of contracts / $r Eirik G. Furubotn -- $t The contract as economic trade / $r Jacques Ghestin -- $t Contract theory and theories of contract regulation / $r Alan Schwartz -- $t Economic reasoning and the framing of contract law : sale of an asset of uncertain value / $r Victor P. Goldberg -- $t A transactions-cost approach to the analysis of property rights / $r Gary D. Libecap -- $t Transaction costs and incentive theory / $r Eric Malin and David Martimort -- $t Norms and the theory of the firm / $r Oliver Hart -- $t Allocating decision rights under liquidity constraints / $r Philippe Aghion and Patrick Rey -- $t Complexity and contract / $r W. Bentley Macleod -- $t Authority, as flexibility, is at the core of labor contracts / $r Olivier Favereau and Bernard Walliser -- $t Positive agency theory : place and contributions / $r Gérard Charreaux -- $t Econometrics of contracts : an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting / $r Scott E. Masten and Stéphane Saussier -- $t Experiments on moral hazard and incentives : reciprocity and surplus-sharing / $r Claudia Keser and Marc Willinger -- $t Residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts : substitutes or complements? / $r Francine LaFontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud -- $t The quasi-judicial role of large retailers : an efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers / $r Benito Arruñada -- $t Interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks : from strategic behaviors to property rights / $r Godefroy Dang-Nguyen and Thierry Pénard -- $t Licensing in the chemical industry / $r Ashish Arora and Andrea Fosfuri -- $t Inter-company agreements and EC competition law / $r Michel Glais -- $t Incentive contracts in utility regulation / $r Matthew Bennett and Catherine Waddams Price -- $t Contractual choice and performance : the case of water supply in France / $r Claude Ménard and Stéphane Saussier -- $t Institutional or structural : lessons from international electricity sector reforms -- $r Guy L. F. Holburn and Pablo T. Spiller -- $t Electricity sector restructuring and competition : a transactions-cost perspective / $r Paul L. Joskow.
520 $a A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: 'incentive theory', 'incomplete-contract theory' and 'transaction-costs theory'. These frameworks have enabled scholars to renew both the microeconomics of coordination (with implications for industrial organization, labor economics, law and economics, organization design) and the macroeconomics of 'market' (decentralized) economies and of the institutional framework. These developments have resulted in new analyses of a firm's strategy and State intervention (regulation of public utilities, anti-trust, public procurement, institutional design, liberalization policies, etc.). Based on contributions by the leading scholars in the field, this 2002 book provides an overview of developments in these analytical currents, presents their various aspects, and proposes expanding horizons for theoreticians and practitioners.
650 0 $a Contracts $x Economic aspects. $3 393129
700 1 $a Brousseau, Eric, $e editor. $3 644435
700 1 $a Glachant, Jean-Michel, $e editor. $3 644436
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856 4 0 $u http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613807